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COMBATING ORGANIZED CRIME WITH
UNION DEMOCRACY: A CASE STUDY OF THE
ELECTION REFORM IN UNITED STATES V.

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS
James B. Jacobs & Dimitri D. Portnoi*
In attempting to rid the InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters of the
entrenched organized-crime influence that had controlled the union for
decades, the Department of Justice's 1988 civil RICO suit against the
union 's leadership initiated historic changes in how that union selects
its leadership. This Article documents and analyzes the election-reform
prong of the consent order that settled the RICO suit. While reformers
had hoped that fair rank-and-file elections would lead to their control
of the union, that has not occurred,nor have fair elections produced a
model union democracy. However, the election reforms have
contributed to the purging of organized crime's influence from the
union and make it more difficult for labor racketeers to regain control
in thefuture.

INTRODUCTION

The ambition of the U.S. Department of Justice's 1988 civil
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act' ("RICO")
lawsuit against the top leadership of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters was to purge organized crime's presence and influence
from the union, including its international headquarters, more than

* James B. Jacobs is Chief Justice Warren E. Burger Professor of Constitutional Law and
the Courts and Director of the Center for Research in Crime and Justice at New York University
School of Law. Dimitri D. Portnoi is a Field Organizer for the Missouri Public Interest Research
Group.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 (2000). RICO was enacted in 1970 to protect the public from
organized criminal activity affecting interstate commerce. See generally Pamela H. Bucy &
Steven T. Marshall, An Overview of RICO, 51 ALA. LAW. 283 (explaining the purpose and scope
of RICO).
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six hundred locals, and dozens of regional councils.' The suit was
part of the government's campaign against the Italian-American
organized crime "families" known as the Mafia or Cosa Nostra.3 By
the time the case was filed,4 the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") and the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") had successfully
investigated and prosecuted hundreds of organized crime cases all
around the country, especially in the mid-Atlantic, Northeast, and
Midwest regionsf In New York City, home to five Cosa Nostra
families, several hundred agents worked primarily on organizedcrime investigations.6
The FBI agents and federal prosecutors were well aware of the
remedial limitations of criminal prosecution.7 They understood that
Cosa Nostra represents the epitome of organizational criminality and
that the families replace imprisoned soldiers and leaders by internal
reassignments and promotions.8 Consequently, federal investigators
and prosecutors sought to attack Cosa Nostra's bases of economic,
political, and organizational strength,9 especially in labor unions."l
In the 1950s, a number of investigations revealed widespread
Cosa Nostra labor racketeering in the International Longshoreman's
Association.11 From 1957 to 1959, the U.S. Senate's McClellan
Committee (John F. Kennedy was a member and Robert Kennedy
was chief counsel) exposed extensive corruption and racketeering in
the Teamsters and several other national and international unions. 2
In the 1970s and 1980s, Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) continued to
hold hearings on various aspects of labor racketeering."

2.

JAMES B. JACOBS ET AL., BUSTING THE MOB: UNITED STATES V. COSA NOSTRA 167-81

(1994).
3. Id. at 3-28, 167-81.
4. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 4486 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1988).
5. James B. Jacobs & Lauryn P. Gouldin, Cosa Nostra: The Final Chapter? 25 CRIME &
JUST.: REV. RES. 129, 129-82 (1999).
6. JACOBS ET AL., supra note 2, at 3-28.
7. See JAMES B. JACOBS, MOBSTERS, UNIONS, AND FEDS 238-53 (2006).

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. JACOBS ET AL., supra note 2, at 6.
12. Id. at 168-70.
13. James B. Jacobs & Elizabeth A. Mullin, Congress' Role in the Defeat of Organized
Crime, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 269, 287 (2003).
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In 1982, the DOJ brought its first civil RICO suit against a labor
union, a large Teamsters local in New Jersey.14 The case, United
5
States v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters Local 560," went
to trial and resulted in a resounding victory for the government. The
judge appointed a trustee and vested him with wide-ranging authority
to run the local, supervise its elections, and purge organized crime's
influence.' 6 Several other labor racketeering cases against local
unions followed.17 The 1986 Report of the President's Commission
on Organized Crime urged the DOJ to file such a suit against the
leadership of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("IBT"). 8
By 1988, the groundwork was laid for the first civil RICO suit
against an entire international union. 9 The complaint was filed in
New York City even though the Teamsters' headquarters, "the
Marble Palace,"2 is located in Washington D.C.2 New York's FBI
field office was the most aggressive and creative in organized-crime
investigations, and U.S. Attorney Rudy Giuliani previously had
brought several of the most important organized-crime prosecutions
in U.S. history.22 Undoubtedly, because he had formerly served as
assistant deputy attorney general, Giuliani had considerable influence
with "Main Justice" in Washington in procuring authority over the
case.

23

The government's civil RICO complaint listed scores of murders
and assaults of IBT dissidents in order to document the Mafia's
pervasive presence in union affairs. Proving a history of extensive
labor racketeering within the Teamsters Union posed a lesser
14. JACOBS, supra note 7, at 161-82.
15. 948 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1991).
16. See Robert C. Stewart, Reflections on Labor Racketeering and Interdisciplinary
Enforcement, 9 TRENDS IN ORGANIZED CRIME 60, 95 (2006).
17. JACOBS, supra note 7, at 182.
18. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE EDGE: ORGANIZED CRIME,
BUSINESS, AND LABOR UNIONS (1986); see also KENNETH C. CROWE, COLLISION: HOW THE
RANK AND FILE TOOK BACK THE TEAMSTERS 85 (1993).
19. James B. Jacobs & Dimitri D. Portnoi, Administrative CriminalLaw & Procedurein the
Teamsters Union: What Has Been Achieved After (Nearly) Twenty Years, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 429, 491-93 (2007).
20. Minnesota Newspaper Teamsters Say No to Concessions, TEAMSTERS FOR A
DEMOCRATIC UNION, Sept. 10, 2008, http://www.tdu.org/node/2350.
21. United States v. InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters.was filed in the Southern
District of New York. 728 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
22. JACOBS ET AL., supra note 2, at 167-81.
23. See id. at 20.
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challenge than crafting a remedy that offered a reasonable chance of
success. The civil RICO complaint itself did not specifically set out
how systemic organizational change was going to be accomplished,
although the government asked for court supervision, carried out by
court-appointed officers.
Teamsters for a Democratic Union ("TDU"), a well-established
Teamsters rank-and-file "dissident" group long dedicated to
reforming the union, pressed the DOJ in Washington and the U.S.
Attorney's office in New York City to make election reform the
keystone of any settlement or ultimate injunctive relief.24 Once the
suit was filed, TDU (with legal assistance from the ACLU) sought to
intervene in the lawsuit as an independent party." Judge Edelstein
denied that petition, but the Second Circuit ultimately allowed TDU
to intervene.26 TDU ultimately persuaded the government lawyers to
make union election reform an important part of the settlement.
The government's civil RICO suit against the IBT settled in
1989 on the eve of trial.2 The settlement embodied an agreement to
purge the union of corruption and racketeering, to empower three
court-appointed officers to investigate and prosecute wrongdoing,
and to supervise fair and democratic elections of the general
president and other international union officers who comprise the
General Executive Board.29 In a previous article, the authors
provided an empirical analysis of the disciplinary prong of the
"trusteeship," an effort that has ultimately resulted in the suspension

24. See CROWE, supra note 18, at 19; JACOBS ET AL., supra note 2, at 174-75.
25. JACOBS ET AL., supra note 2, at 172. TDU was represented by Paul Levy of Public
Citizen and Tom Geoghegan, a Chicago labor lawyer. Levy continued to represent TDU's
interests in the litigation until the late 1990s. He considers his most important successes to have
been persuading the U.S. Attorney to make election reform a keystone of the remedy, protecting
the TDU membership list from public disclosure, and (with Geoghegan) persuading Judge
Edelstein to reject Election Officer Holland's first proposed election rules in favor of rules that
gave the EO a great deal more responsibility for supervising the election. Telephone Interview
with Paul Levy, Staff Attorney, Public Citizen Litigation Group (Jan. 22, 2009). The ACLU
lawyer representing TDU was Helen Hershkoff. She obtained pro bono assistance from Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP in New York City. Interview with Helen Hershkoff,
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, in N.Y. (Dec. 1, 2008).
26. Interview with Helen Hershkoff, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law,
in N.Y. (Dec. 1, 2008).
27. JACOBS ETAL., supra note 2, at 174.
28. Id. at 170-77.
29. Id.
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or expulsion of more than five hundred members and officers." In
this Article, we document and analyze the election-reform prong of
the trusteeship. If anything, this remediation has been even more
ambitious than the disciplinary effort. Indeed, it has been so
extensive, required such extraordinary resources, and generated so
much litigation that it is easy to lose sight of its initial rationale.
It bears emphasizing that the extraordinary twenty-year effort by
the government and the federal district court to assure fair and
democratic elections in the Teamsters Union was not occasioned by,
and cannot be justified by, a desire to achieve an ideal model of
union democracy. The purpose of the civil RICO lawsuit was to
purge organized crime's influence from the IBT, and ultimately the
remedial litigation should be judged on that criterion.
It is true, of course, that the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act,31 which
was a response to the labor racketeering exposed by the McClellan
Committee hearings, also sought to enlist union democracy as an
antidote to union corruption and racketeering. 2 However, it has
never been rigorously enforced and its ideals have gone unfulfilled.
Were it otherwise, there would have been no need for the 1988 civil
RICO suit.
The TDU officers may have believed or at least hoped that fair
elections would enable them and like-minded reformers to obtain
control of the IBT. That dream came close to being realized when,
in 1991, in the Teamsters' first rank-and-file election of international
officers, Ron Carey defeated two candidates associated with the
long-dominant regime. But, Carey's expulsion from the union in
1997 on account of campaign finance violations dealt the rank-andfile reform movement a blow from which it has not recovered.
While the Mafia's influence has been mostly eliminated, the
incumbent Hoffa administration thoroughly dominates the union.

30. Jacobs & Portnoi, supra note 19, at 483-90.
31. 29 U.S.C. 401-531 (2000).
32. Jacobs & Portnoi, supra note 19, at 472.
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I. THE CIVIL RICO SUIT, SETTLEMENT
AND IBT RESISTANCE
A. The Complaint, the Consent Order,and the
Commitment to Free and FairElections
On June 28, 1988, the U.S. Attorney's Office in Manhattan filed
a civil RICO complaint against the IBT, eighteen members of its
General Executive Board ("GEB"), more than a dozen Mafia bosses,
and the Mafia "Commission."33 The complaint called the IBT "a
captive labor organization, which has been infiltrated, dominated,
exploited and controlled by La Cosa Nostra figures."34 U.S. Attorney
Rudy Giuliani explained that the lawsuit aimed to end the Mafia's
powerful and long-standing influence in the union with a remedy
"that will allow the many honest members of the Teamsters to run
their own affairs in a democratic manner and participate in GEB
elections that are free and fair."3 5 The lawsuit sought "court
oversight [which would last] only for so long as necessary to
eliminate organized crime's influence over the Teamsters, to put
permanent reforms into place, and to return control of the Teamsters
to the many honest working men and women of the union."36
The 113-page complaint drew on a well of information from
congressional hearings,3 7 criminal and civil litigation, media reports,
books and articles, cooperating government witnesses, electronically
intercepted conversations, and investigative material contributed by
all fifty-eight FBI field divisions.3 8 The report of the President's
Commission on Organized Crime39 also provided valuable
information, including former IBT General President Roy Williams's

33. JACOBS, supra note 7, at 204-11.
34. Complaint 53 at *14, United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 4486
(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1988).
35. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Outline of Civil
Complaint 3-4 (June 28, 1988) (on file with authors).
36. Id. at 4.
37. See generally Jacobs & Mullin, supra note 13, at 277 (reviewing the many congressional
investigations of organized crime).
38. Federal Government's Use of Trusteeships Under the RICO Statute: Hearings Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 101st

Cong. 593 (1989) (statement of Floyd I. Clarke, Executive Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation) [hereinafter 1989 RICO Hearings].
39. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 18.
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testimony that "[e]very big [Teamsters] local union . . .had some

connection with organized crime."4
The complaint alleged that, for decades, Cosa Nostra exercised
"substantial influence" over the international union4 ' through the
office of the IBT general president.42 It further alleged that Cosa
Nostra influenced IBT elections for international officers, including
the general president and members of the GEB.43 According to the
complaint, Cosa Nostra directed the selection of the previous two
IBT presidents, Roy Williams and Jackie Presser.44 "While the
technical procedures by which the Teamsters elect their President has
been adjudged lawful ...

the Government alleges ...

that La Cosa

Nostra members and associates have taken control of and perverted
that election process to insure the election of candidates under their
influence."45 In a press release, Giuliani charged that:
In return [for keeping the dominant clique in power] union
officers have allowed La Cosa Nostra ready access to union
funds and jobs and free reign over certain IBT Locals,
which La Cosa Nostra figures have used as
instrumentalities to extort monies from employers. Thus,
the IBT's leaders get their union offices, and La Cosa
Nostra figures get their money-all to the detriment of
union members, victimized businesses and the general
public.46
The complaint sought a court-implemented remedial effort that
would purge the union of Cosa Nostra members and influence.4
Emphasizing the importance of free elections for breaking Cosa
Nostra's hold on the union, the complaint sought an election of
international union officers, run by a court-appointed trustee in such
a manner that it would not be vulnerable to intimidation and
improper influence and would "reflect the decision of the union
40. Id. at 89.
41. Complaint, supra note 34,

53 at *14.

56-57 at *15; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 18, at
42. Id.
123.
43. Complaint, supra note 34, T 73(e) at *28.
44. Id. T 59 at *16.
45. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Outline of Civil
Complaint 3-4 (June 28, 1988) (on file with authors).
46. Id.
47. Complaint, supra note 34, 117(d) at *46.
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members who are found to be eligible to vote. '48 The complaint
asked the court to appoint a trustee who would be empowered to
prevent racketeering "until such time as free and fair elections can be
held ....,"4' The IBT's General Executive Board passed a resolution
prohibiting individual union defendants from settling with the
Judge Edelstein ordered the GEB to rescind that
government."
1
ruling.
Several GEB defendants, fearing burdensome attorneys'
fees, entered into settlement talks and eventually agreed to resign
from the union. 2
Assistant U.S. Attorney Randy Mastro pressed for a courtappointed officer empowered to veto the union's expenditures and
appointments and with authority to run the next five elections for
international officers.5 3 A week later, the union defendants counterproposed that the court's remedial authority be divided among: an
"independent magistrate" to hear and decide disciplinary matters; a
"review officer" to investigate and file disciplinary charges; and an
"election supervisor" to review, but not conduct, the election at the
1991 convention.5 4 Mastro agreed to the troika plan in principle but
with: (1) an independent administrator who would wield disciplinary
and certain other powers of the IBT general president and GEB; (2)
an investigations officer who would investigate and prosecute
administratively violations of the consent agreement, federal labor
law, and the IBT constitution; and (3) an election officer who would
"supervise" the 1991 and 1996 international officers elections. 5
According to Mastro's proposal, rank-and-file IBT members would
directly elect the general president and general secretary-treasurer,
while the other international officers would be elected by convention
48. Id. I 117(e) at *46.
49. Id. I I117(f) at *46.
50. See CROWE, supra note 18, at 95-97.
51. See id. at 93, 97.
52. See Jacobs & Portnoi, supra note 19, at 439. On January 17, 1989, after five individual
members of the GEB met with DOJ to discuss settlements, the GEB voted to prohibit individuals
from settling separately.
53. See CROWE, supra note 18, at 93, 95. The union defendants rejected this first draft, in
part because the election provisions were vague, providing only that a single court-appointed
officer would run the union as well as the next five elections. Three days later, Mastro responded
with a new draft that proposed direct rank and file election of only the general president and
general secretary-treasurer. Id.
54. See id. at 95.
55. Id.
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delegates. 6 Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Labor would
supervise the 2001, 2006, and 2011 elections." The GEB rejected
this and several subsequent proposals. 8 IBT General Counsel James
T. Grady told the press: "The entire document, from page one to the
last page, was totally unacceptable and an insult to the entire
American labor movement and the Teamsters in particular."59
Two days before trial, 6° after having previously rejected a
proposal for direct elections of only a few international officers, the
GEB agreed to rank-and-file elections of the entire board.6' Two
days later, Judge Edelstein approved a consent order whose preamble
stated: "WHEREAS, the union defendants agree that it is imperative
that the IBT, as the largest trade union in the free world, be
maintained democratically, with integrity and for the sole benefit of
its members and without unlawful outside influence. ' '62 The order
called for a triumvirate of court-appointed officers-an independent
administrator, investigations officer, and election officer. The
investigations officer would investigate and prosecute violations of
the consent order and the Teamsters constitution and, when
appropriate, bring disciplinary charges before the independent
administrator, who would function as a judge. 63 The roles of these
two remedial officers would be phased out after the election officer
("EO") certified the 1991 election.' However, their authority would
largely be subsumed by a three-member Independent Review Board
make
that would continue to investigate wrongdoing,
if
and,
charges
disciplinary
about
IBT
the
to
recommendations
dissatisfied with the IBT's response, adjudicate and punish
disciplinary charges.65
The consent order provided that "[international officers] be
elected by direct rank-and-file voting by secret ballot in unionwide,
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 96.

60. Id. at 97.
61. Id. at 98.
62. Consent Order at 2, United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 4486 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 14, 1989), availableat http://www.irbcases.org/pdfs/ConsentDecree.pdf.
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 19-23.
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one-member, one-vote elections .
"..."66 It authorized the EO to
"supervise" the international union elections." Only two sentences
dealt with the scope of the EO's powers: "In advance of each
election, the Election Officer shall have the right to distribute
materials about the election to the IBT membership. The Election
Officer shall supervise the balloting process and certify the election
results for each of these elections as promptly as possible after the
balloting."68 The consent order invested the EO with "authority to
employ accountants, consultants, experts, investigators, or any other
personnel ...."" It also set forth basic rules to govern IBT elections

for international officials, including procedures for convention
delegate selection, nomination of international officers, and direct
mail rank-and-file voting for international officers.7" To serve as EO,
Judge Edelstein selected Michael Holland, a labor lawyer who
previously served as general counsel to the United Mine Workers,
one of just a few international unions that select international officers
by a rank-and-file election. 7
B. Defining the Election Officer's Authority:
The Autumn ofDiscontent

The relationship between the court-appointed officers and the
union in the months following the finalization of the consent order
proved so contentious that Judge Edelstein called this period "The
Autumn of Discontent."72 The international union and a number of
IBT locals went to court to challenge the actions of the courtappointed officers.73

This litigation resulted in Judge Edelstein's

extraordinary All Writs Act74 injunction, ordering that any litigation
over the consent order be brought only in his court.75

66. Id. at 15.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 15-16.
69. Id.at 17.
70. Id. at 13-16.
71. See CROWE, supra note 18, at 106.

72. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 728 F. Supp. 1032, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
73. Id.
at 1040-42.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
75. Int'l Bhd of Teamsters, 728 F. Supp. at 1044.
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1. IBT Challenges to the Court-Appointed Officers
On July 19, 1989, Elections Officer Michael Holland notified
the DOJ and the IBT that he intended to follow a notice-and-

comment procedure76 in promulgating guidelines for the 1991
international election process." The IBT objected, contending that
Holland lacked authority to issue guidelines for the selection of

convention delegates and for the nomination of candidates for
international office.78 According to IBT General Counsel Grady, by

using the word "supervise" rather than "conduct," the consent order
envisioned a passive EO-monitoring role.79 Grady insisted that the
1991 international election should be governed by the IBT
constitution and local union election bylaws, not by the consent

order.8"
Grady criticized Holland's staff as "unnecessary and
unwarranted" and their salaries as "excessive."'" Holland responded
that he was responsible for overseeing an unprecedented union
election, an "enormous undertaking" requiring "much planning,
significant training, education and communication with the IBT
membership, and ultimately significant personnel and financial
resources .. . ."" He defended the proposed staff salaries as being in
line with salaries for similarly situated IBT employees.83
Under the consent order, the Independent Administrator,
Frederick B. Lacey,84 and not the EO, had the authority to make an
application to the court.85 Therefore, on Holland's behalf, 6 Lacey
76. On July 19, 1989, Holland informed IBT General Counsel James T. Grady that he would
hire a consultant and three full-time staffers to work at an EO headquarters located in the Marble
Palace in Washington, D.C. Affadavit in Support of Application II of the Independent
Administrator at 2, United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 4486 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
29, 1989) [hereinafter Holland Affidavit].
77. Id. 2.
78. MICHAEL HOLLAND, THE COOKBOOK: HOW THE ELECTION OFFICER SUPERVISED THE
1991 TEAMSTER ELECTION ch. 1, at 2 (July, 1992) (on file with authors).
79. Holland Affidavit, supra note 76, 7.
80. Id.
81. Id.
3, 15. In an attempt to rally rank-and-file opinion, Grady published these
82. Id.
objections in the International Teamster, a monthly magazine mailed to all Teamster members.
Id.
2-4.
83. Id.
84. Lacey was a former New Jersey U.S. attorney and former federal district court judge.
Jacobs & Portnoi, supra note 19, at 442.
85. Consent Order, supra note 62, at 18.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42:335

asked Judge Edelstein to clarify the scope of the EO's authority, to
approve the EO's draft timetable for the 1991 election, and to order
8 7 Lacey
the IBT to comply with the EO's proposal for hiring staff.
admitted that there was a bona fide dispute "concern[ing] the
application and interpretation of [the consent order's election
provisions] and particularly the meaning of [the] phrase '[t]he
Election Officer shall supervise the IBT election."'' 8
The IBT
insisted that "supervise," as used in the consent order, only covered
the distribution of informational materials to the membership,
overseeing balloting, and certifying election results.89 According to
the IBT, the consent order did not authorize Holland to supervise the
selection of convention delegates or nominating procedures for
candidates for international office. 9°
Judge Edelstein ruled that "supervise" should be interpreted
according to its most expansive and proactive dictionary meaning,91
"to coordinate, direct, and inspect continuously and at first hand the
accomplishment of; oversee with the powers of direction and
decision the implementation of. . ,,."
In addition, he held that the
consent order's reference to the "' 1991 election' . . . was intended to
encompass the entire electoral process [including convention
delegate selection] which will culminate in the 1991 election ... ""
Pointing out that the Teamsters' 1.7 million members
constituted more voters than the voting populations of twenty-six
states,94 Judge Edelstein labeled as "disingenuous" the IBT's
opposition to the EO's request for three support staff and a
consultant.95 He also ruled that since the IBT had strenuously
criticized the EO in the International Teamster, the union's official

86. Id.
87. Application II of the Independent Administrator, United States v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 4486 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1989) (on file with authors).
88. Id. at 1-2.
89. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 723 F. Supp. 203, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff d,
931 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1991). The consent order provided that the EO "certify" the election, but
did not define that term. Consent Order, supra note 62, at 15-16.
90. Int'7Bhd. of Teamsters, 723 F. Supp. at 207.
91. Id. at 206.
92. Id.

93. Id.
at 207.
94. Id. at 208.
95. Id. at 208-09.

Winter 2009]

COMBATING ORGANIZED CRIME

magazine, it was reasonable for the EO to hire a public relations
firm.96 In addition, Judge Edelstein approved the 1991 election
timetable and ordered the IBT to direct IBT locals to comply with the
EO's Local Union Survey that sought information about each local's
past and present election procedures.97 He ruled that "it is within the
scope of the duties of the Election Officer to take any further
reasonable actions necessary to carry out his duties as the Election
Officer and ensure fair elections for the IBT membership."98
Because of the IBT's repeated attempts to stymie the EO's effort to
hire and pay staff, Judge Edelstein approved the DOJ's creation of a
fund that the three court-appointed officers could draw against to
cover expenses and that the IBT would have to replenish.99 These
rulings blunted the international union's attack on the EO, but IBT
locals and joint councils continued to challenge the EO's authority,
as well as the authority of the Investigations Officer ("1O").
2. Defining the Independent Administrator's
Authority under the Consent Order
To place fully in context the IBT's resistance to the EO, it is
important to note the union's effort to undermine all the courtappointed officers, including and especially the Independent
Administrator ("IA"). As IA, Judge Edelstein appointed Frederick
B. Lacey, a former New Jersey U.S. Attorney and a former federal
district court judge. IA Lacey exercised a veto over all IBT
appointments, contracts, and expenditures. He also sat as judge on
disciplinary charges filed by the IO.l"' The IBT launched a wide96. Id. at 209.
For more information on the Local Union Survey, see infra text
97. Id. at 208.
accompanying notes 146-47.
98. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 723 F. Supp. at 207.
99. Id. at210.
100. Internal Review Board HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1998) [hereinafter IRB
Hearings] (statement of J. Frederick B. Lacey, Member, Independent Review Board). Lacey did
not have anything like sufficient resources or staff to oversee the IBT's day-to-day vast
operations. He reviewed only the largest expenditures and contracts. He let most personnel
appointments go forward, subject to the possibility of subsequent removal. Importantly, Lacey's
veto power depended upon a reasonable belief that a contemplated act amounted to racketeering
activity; he had no authority to veto "imprudent acts." Id. at 16 (statement of Charles M.
Carberry, Investigations Officer, Independent Review Board).
When asked whether the IRB, or its predecessor IA, could step in should the Teamsters purchase
a Learjet, 10 Carberry responded:
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ranging attack on Lacey's decisions.1"' For example, the IBT
challenged Lacey's authority to interpret the Teamsters'
constitution." 2 Judge Edelstein held that because the consent order
had the legal status of Teamsters constitutional law,0 3 the IA's
disciplinary authority necessarily included the authority to interpret
the IBT constitution's disciplinary provisions. 4
3. IBT Locals' Challenges to the CourtAppointed Officers' Authority
Several IBT locals also challenged the court-appointed officers'
authority. On November 17, 1989, five Chicago-area local unions
filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois, challenging the
authority of EO Holland to change the IBT constitution's election
procedures. 5 One of the plaintiffs, Daniel Ligurotis, secretarytreasurer of Local 705 and an IBT international vice-president, had
signed the settlement.0 6 The Chicago suit's first count contended
that the consent order was void because, by purporting to amend the
Under the consent decree now, imprudent acts would not fall within anybody's
oversight. One of the differences that I saw between the Teamsters' consent decree
and some of the other Civil RICO consent decrees involving other unions around the
country is that, even the initial court officers had certain limits on both their
responsibilities and their powers.
Id.
101. For example, the consent order required that the GEB, prior to every meeting, provide
the IA notice and an agenda and notice. Consent Order, supra note 62, at 10. By chance, Lacey
heard from a journalist that an upcoming GEB meeting was scheduled to interpret the term "bring
reproach" in the Teamsters constitution. IRB Hearings, supra note 100, at 12 (statement of J.
Frederick B. Lacey, Member, Independent Review Board). Lacey noted wryly, "[a]nd by
coincidence, with their interpretation the charge we had pending against an international vice
president for association with organized crime would not be prosecutable." Id.
102. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Friedman & Hughes), 743 F. Supp. 155
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 905 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1990).
103. Id. at 160.
104. In answer to a congressional committee's question whether the IBT had complied with
the consent order, Lacey responded, "That is a question I could spend the rest of the week on.
They fought me at every tm." IRB Hearings,supra note 100, at 12 (statement of J. Frederick B.
Lacey, Member, Independent Review Board).
105. Investigations Officer v. Friedman & Hughes, Decision of the Independent
Administrator 9-11 (Jan. 22, 1990), affd, Friedman & Hughes, 743 F. Supp. 155.
106. Id. at 9-10. At a membership meeting one week after Judge Edelstein's decision
affirming the EO's actions, Ligurotis was quoted as saying, "I'm not going to go along with any
of this shit. Nobody's going to come up and tell me how to run my locals." Id. At the next
membership meeting, one day before filing suit, Ligurotis told the membership that Holland was
"overstepping his bounds," that "we're not getting a fair shake in New York," and then declared
"fuck the Government-they're not going to get this union away from me!" Id.
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IBT constitution without following that constitution's amendment

procedures, it violated the Landrum-Griffin Act (formally the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act)." 7 Count two alleged
that the consent order, as interpreted by Judge Edelstein, violated the
IBT constitution.0 8 Count three charged that enforcement of the
consent order required infringement of the contracts between the
international union and its subordinate entities.10 9 Count four
asserted that the consent order violated an implied contract between
each Teamster member and his or her local union."0
In response to the Chicago suit, the U.S. Attorney in the
Southern District of New York asked Judge Edelstein to issue an All
Writs Act'.. injunction prohibiting any further action in the Chicago
suit and ordering Ligurotis held in contempt of the consent order's
On
bar on interference with the court-appointed officers." 2
November 27, 1989, Judge Edelstein granted the injunction." 3

107. Local 301 v. Holland, 732 F. Supp. 918, 921 (N.D. Ill. 1990). The court described the
allegations as follows:
In Count I, the Chicago plaintiffs contend that the consent decree amended the IBT
constitution without complying with Article III, §§ 8, 9 and Article IX, § 7 and in
derogation of the plenary authority of the delegates to an IBT convention as set out in
various provisions of the IBT constitution. They also contend that the consent decree
amended the bylaws of the local unions without a membership vote.
Id.
108. Id. ("In Count II, the Chicago plaintiffs claim that the consent decree as interpreted by
the New York court violates various IBT constitution provisions.").
109. Id. ("In Count III, they contend that enforcement of the consent decree 'constitutes
violations of contract, viz., provisions of the 1986 IBT constitution alleged herein."').
110. Id. ("Finally, in Count IV, the Chicago plaintiffs assert that enforcement of the consent
decree 'constitutes violations of contract, viz., provisions of Chicago plaintiffs Local Unions
Bylaws alleged herein."'); see United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Chicago Suit), 726 F.
Supp. 943, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 899 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1990).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000).
112. Chicago Suit, 726 F. Supp. at 944-45.
113. Id. at 947. Two days following this decision, the Chicago plaintiffs submitted an
amended complaint dropping Ligurotis as a plaintiff. Id. Nonetheless, Judge Edelstein found
Ligurotis in contempt for "a blatant attempt to forum shop for relief from rulings he perceives as
adverse" and further found that Ligurotis "has the singular power to force the withdrawal of this
suit." Id. at 948. Judge Edelstein imposed substantial fines against Ligurotis, which continued to
increase until the Chicago suit was withdrawn. Id. at 949-50. However, the Second Circuit
reversed in part, holding that Ligurotis could only be held in contempt for the period during
which he was a named plaintiff, he could not be held responsible for coercing other plaintiffs to
drop the suit. Chicago Suit, 899 F.2d at 148-49. The IA subsequently permanently barred
Ligurotis from the IBT, finding him culpable on two counts: (1) obtaining an interest-free loan
from his local union; and (2) "engaging in a pattern of conduct that rewarded corruption and
allowed unlawful activity to flourish." United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Ligurotis), 814
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On December 1, 1989, Cleveland Local 507 President and
International Vice President Harold Friedman filed suit in the
Northern District of Ohio against the IA, the 10, and the IBT,
alleging that the consent order breached his local's contract with the
international union.'14
Judge Edelstein ordered Local 507 to
withdraw the suit and ordered Friedman to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt." 5 After Friedman's lengthy and
emotional testimony, Edelstein gave Friedman one week to withdraw
7
the suit or be held in contempt." 6 Friedman complied."
On December 8, 1989, New Jersey IBT Joint Council 73 filed
suit in the federal District Court of New Jersey challenging 10
Charles M. Carberry's authority to examine the books and records of
the joint council and one of its constituent local unions." 8 Carberry
moved to have the case transferred to Judge Edelstein's court," 9 and
New Jersey District Court Judge David Ackerman so ordered. 20

F. Supp. 1165, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The latter charge cited Ligurotis's vexatious litigation in
the Chicago Suit. Id. at 1170.
114. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (All Writs Act Opinion), 728 F. Supp. 1032,
1037-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
115. Id. at 1038.
116. All Writs Act Opinion, 728 F. Supp. at 1038-39.
117. Id.
118. Joint Council 73 v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Joint Council 73 11), 741 F. Supp. 491, 492
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
119. Id.
120. Id. Even after Judge Edelstein's All Writs Act order, Joint Council 73 proved to be a
contumacious litigant. It sought to have Judge Edelstein removed from the case due to bias.
Joint Council 73 v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Joint Council 73 1), 734 F. Supp. 626, 627 (S.D.N.Y.
1990). After Judge Edelstein dismissed that suit, the Joint Council attempted to block Carberry's
access to books and records. At one appointment to inspect the books, the union officers refused
to allow the 10's agents to use the office photocopier and were instructed to leave on account of
the office assistant's sudden illness. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Joint Council 73
i1), 134 F.R.D. 50, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). On another day, after making an appointment, the
agents found the Joint Council's offices locked. Id. at 56. When Judge Edelstein left for an
August vacation, the joint council filed a new lawsuit challenging the 10's power to take sworn
statements. The complaint alleged that Judge Edelstein's previous ruling on the point "betrays a
monumental ignorance of federal labor law." Id. at 57. Infuriated, Edelstein required the parties
to present oral arguments at 6:30 p.m. that evening at his vacation home on Long Island. Id. at
58-59. He described the suit as "a case study in vexatious, harassing litigation brought without
any proper purpose." Id. at 61. He criticized the union attorneys for being unprepared,
"violat[ing] the most basic responsibility of a lawyer to her client and the court-to be prepared
in court." Id. Judge Edelstein imposed sanctions upon the attorneys in excess of $35,000. Id. at
64. The Second Circuit ultimately vacated those sanctions. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 948 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1991).
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C. Judge Edelstein'sAll Writs Act Opinion
After Judge Edelstein enjoined lawsuits in Illinois, Ohio, and
New Jersey, U.S. Attorney Benito Romano (Giuliani's successor)
requested an All Writs Act injunction against any and all lawsuits
seeking to litigate issues arising under the consent order from being
On
filed in any forum other than Judge Edelstein's courtroom.'
December 15, 1989, Judge Edelstein signed an order requiring all
(approximately seven hundred) subordinate IBT entities to show
cause why such an injunction should not be granted.122 General
President William McCarthy telexed to all Teamster locals, "I urge
that you fight this unprecedented and ill-advised attempt of the
government to deprive you and your members of your legal and
constitutional rights."'23 He listed ten legal points for union lawyers
to pursue."'2 Ultimately, 282 out of the 651 local unions, 20 out of
the 44 joint councils, and 2 area conferences submitted timely
25

briefs. 1

In an extraordinary opinion, Judge Edelstein held that because
the consent order vested his court with exclusive jurisdiction 26 and
because there was a significant risk that the order would be
interpreted inconsistently, he would enjoin all other courts from
exercising jurisdiction in cases relating to the IBT consent order.'2 7
Judge Edelstein enlisted the federal All Writs Act to stop the
nationwide litigation against the consent order and the courtappointed officers. 28 Dating back to the nation's founding, 29 the
infrequently used All Writs Act states: "The Supreme Court and all
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to

121. All Writs Act Opinion, 728 F. Supp at 1036.
122. Id. at 1039.
123. CROWE, supra note 18, at 121.
124. All Writs Act Opinion, 78 F. Supp. at 1030 n.18.
125. Id. at 1040.
126. Id. at 1044.
127. Id. at 1046-49.
128. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Joint Council 73 II1), 134 F.R.D. 50, 58-59
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
129. See In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 177-78 (1st Cir. 1954).
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The Act has been used to enjoin

"repeated, baseless, vexatious litigation by the same plaintiff in a
federal court" and, under certain circumstances, to enjoin parallel
proceedings. 3 ' By ordering the entire membership of the Teamsters
to submit to the jurisdiction of his court and by enjoining other courts
from exercising jurisdiction related to the consent order in the IBT
cases, Judge Edelstein may have issued the most sweeping All Writs
Act injunction in American history.
It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of this decision.
It operated against every Teamsters member, IBT subordinate unit,
and IBT employer, as well as against all other courts. 32 Without
Judge Edelstein's all out commitment to enforcing the consent order,
the civil RICO suit would certainly have failed.
II.

SUPERVISING THE

1991 ELECTION

A. The Rules for the 1991 Election: Challengesfrom the
InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters, the Teamstersfor a
Democratic Union, and the Associationfor Union Democracy
The consent order envisioned a three-stage process for electing
international IBT officers. At the first stage, local unions would
elect delegates to a nominating convention.'33 EO Holland's rules set
out detailed secret-balloting procedures for members of IBT locals to
nominate and elect delegates to the IBT national convention.'34 At
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000). On the question of how frequently the All Writs Act is
used, one Supreme Court opinion quipped: "What never? Well, hardly ever!" Allied Chem.
Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) (emphasis omitted).
131. All Writs Act Opinion, 728 F. Supp.at 1043. The All Writs Act was originally codified
in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which Justice O'Connor once described as "the last of the triad of
founding documents, along with the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution itself."
Sandra Day O'Connor, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and the American Judicial Tradition, 59 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990).

132. In order for the All Writs Act injunction to be effective, the court needed personal
jurisdiction over the respondent. In 1996, this was tested when Labatt's Brewery of Toronto,
Canada, refused to comply with the EO's order to allow union campaigning in the company's
parking lot. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Labbat's), 945 F. Supp. 609, 612 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). Judge Edelstein found that Labatt's had the necessary minimum contacts with the United
States because its actions in Canada had an effect in the United States. Specifically, Labatt's
actions in Canada could hinder the ability of the EO to supervise the election in the United States,
thereby compromising the goal of a fair, free, and democratic 1996 election, as well as
endangering the consent order's goal of eradicating organized crime from the IBT. Id. at 621.
133. Consent Order, supra note 62, at 13-15.
134. Id. at 13.
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the second stage, the elected delegates would attend a national
convention that would nominate candidates for general president,
secretary-treasurer, and vice presidents.135 To get on the ballot, a
candidate would need the votes of 5 percent of the delegates.' 36 At
the third stage, Teamsters members would mail in secret-ballots for
the international officers positions.37

The EO's election rules called for both a nominating convention
and direct rank-and-file voting.'38 No labor organization had ever
elected international officers via a process like this. Practically all
American unions elect international union officers at a national
delegate convention. 39 Those few that use direct rank-and-file
voting-such as the United Mine Workers, the United Steel Workers
of America, and the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
of America--do not hold nominating conventions. 4 '
The last step was for the EO to "certify" the 1991 election
results. 4' Neither the consent order nor the election rules defined
this term.'42 Holland proposed that, after the election, the EO should
resolve any post-election protests and announce the final results.'43
Not until after the 1996 election did Judge Edelstein opine on the
meaning of "certify." '44
In order to facilitate compliance with the 1991 election
procedures,' 45 EO Holland decided to utilize or at least build on past

135. Id. at 13-14.
136. Id. at 14. As Holland took on more authority for running the convention, he issued
supplementary rules covering media access, nominating and acceptance speeches, and diverse
operations. HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 3, at 7.
137. Consent Order, supra note 62, at 15. Step three provided that no less than four and no
more than six months after the convention, the international officers would be elected by "direct
rank-and-file voting by secret ballot in unionwide, one-member, one-vote elections." Id.
138. HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 1, at 7.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. ch. 4, at 107-11.
142. Holland devoted a few pages of The Cookbook, his detailed account of the 1991 election,
to the certification question. See id.
143. Id.
144. See infra text accompanying footnotes 653-680.
145. Holland could only draw limited lessons from his experience with the rank-and-file
election procedures of the United Mine Workers Association. Where that union represents
workers in a single industry concentrated mainly in West Virginia and Pennsylvania, the
Teamsters represent workers in many trades and services spread out across the United States and
Canada. See CROWE, supra note 18, at 106.
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practices.' 46 Toward that end, in January, 1990, he sent out the Local
Union Survey'47 to determine how locals currently notified members
of the location, time, and voting procedures for election of
convention delegates.'48
On February 22, 1990, Holland sent the draft election rules to all
Teamsters entities.'49 He convened hearings on the draft rules in San
Francisco, Seattle, New York City, Baltimore, Chicago, Memphis,
Cleveland, and Toronto. 15 Over five hundred Teamsters members
attended these meetings; nearly 125 members offered on-the-record
comments. 5 ' After considering these and other comments, Holland
152
redrafted the rules with an explanatory commentary.
The IBT again insisted that the EO did not possess authority to
promulgate election rules,'53 specifically objecting to the delegate
selection plan, having to provide candidates with free campaign
space in the International Teamster, having to provide membership
lists to all candidates, secret nominations balloting at the national
convention, and numerous other procedures. 54 In dismissing all
these objections, Judge Edelstein relied on the consent order's terms
and on lessons from the 1972 United Mine Workers of America
("UMWA") election that was supervised by the Department of Labor
("DOL") following the assassination of insurgent candidate Joseph
Yablonski.'55 For example, noting that the DOL required the
UMWA's newsletter to publish the views of the different candidates,
Judge Edelstein stated that "[n]o opposition candidate may mount a

146. HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 4, at 107-11. Holland determined that approximately 47
percent of locals already used mail ballots. Moreover, the election of about 39 percent of locals
had been uncontested ("white ballot"). About 28 percent of locals scheduled officer election at
the same time as the delegate elections. See id. ch. 2, at 4.
147. Id. ch. 2, at 2.
148. HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 2, at 2.
149. Id. ch. 1, at 5.
150. Election Rules Order, 742 F. Supp. at 98 n. 1. The cities were selected to ensure that at
least one hearing was held within each area conference. Id.
151. HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 1, at 5.
152. See id. ch. 1,at 6.
153. Election Rules Order, 742 F. Supp. at 98.
154. Id. at 98-106.
155. Id. at 100-02.
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viable challenge to the entrenched IBT plutocracy without standing
of their views."'' 56

on an equal footing with regard to distribution

Initially, EO Holland preferred that locals run their own delegate
elections, with some monitoring by his office. This decision drew

sharp criticism from two groups: (1) TDU, a reform group of rankand-file Teamsters members seeking to promote union democracy,
strengthen financial controls, curb corruption, and elect leaders
dedicated to better contracts; 57 and (2) the Association for Union
Democracy ("AUD"), 5 8 a small Brooklyn-based non-governmental
organization that promotes union democracy.'5 9 Both AUD and TDU

submitted amicus briefs arguing that the proposed election rules did
not provide for sufficient EO supervision. 6 ° AUD attacked the
proposed election rules for leaving local union officers in charge of
printing ballots, determining candidate eligibility, running the
delegate elections and counting the ballots.' 6' AUD charged that
"[i]n the all-pervasive lawlessness that has permeated the union, it
would be foolhardy, even irresponsible, to depend upon the local
'
union officers for safeguarding the integrity of the elections."63162

TDU and the DOJ submitted briefs supporting the AUD position.
The EO and the IA contended that the proposed election rules

already strained the meaning of "supervision," and that any more
156. Id. at 100. As we shall see, this is an extremely insightful statement. In the final
analysis, the fair election procedures established by the consent order have not come close to
putting opposition candidates on an equal footing with candidates who are supported by the
incumbent administration. For an account of the Yablonsky assassination, see HERMAN BENSON,
REBELS, REFORMERS, AND RACKETEERS: How INSURGENTS TRANSFORMED THE LABOR
MOVEMENT 75-76 (2004).
157. See generally DAN LA BOTZ, RANK-AND-FILE REBELLION: TEAMSTERS FOR A
DEMOCRATIC UNION (1990) (discussing the history of the TDU).
158. The Association for Union Democracy (AUD), http://www.uniondemocracy.com (last
visited Feb. 10, 2009).
159. Susan Jennik, who headed AUD's Teamster Fair Election Project and represented AUD
before Judge Edelstein, wondered on receiving the rules: "How the hell can he think these local
officers in the most corrupt union in the country would run a fair election?" See CROWE, supra
note 18, at 123. Herman Benson, also of AUD, put it more colorfully: "The son of a bitch! ...
He's proposing turning the conduct of the election over to the local officials. The whole point of
the RICO suit is these guys are so infiltrated by racketeers that you can't depend on them to run a
clean union." Id. Benson was decidedly skeptical of trusting local union officers to run fair
delegate elections: "All Holland wants to do is receive tally sheets from the locals as to how their
votes went." Id.
160. Election Rules Order, 742 F. Supp. at 106.
161. Rules for the IBT International Union Delegate and Officer Election, art. II, § 2.
162. See CROWE, supra note 18, at 126.
163. Election Rules Order, 742 F. Supp. at 106.
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activism would cross the line from "supervising," to "conducting"
the election."
The IBT also argued that it would be unduly
burdensome to require the JBT to bear the cost of supervision.' 65 By
contrast, the DOJ and the two reform organizations advocated a
much more proactive EO role.'66
Edelstein sided with TDU, AUD, and DOJ. 67 He found that the
proposed election rules failed to satisfy his previous ruling that the
EO should supervise "each and every portion of the election
process."' 68
Complete supervision of all facets of the election
process is the only way to guarantee the integrity of the
elections and encourage extensive rank and file
participation. To that end, the Election Officer must
oversee each and every facet of this election in order to
prevent any possibility of fraud, coercion, intimidation,
harassment, or threat in any of its varied forms. While the
Election Officer has commented that he will consider the
[sic] 'the history of prior proceedings alleging improper
election conduct' in determining the proper amount of
supervision, this subjective determination is insufficient.
Locals where members are intimidated or reluctant to lodge
protests may be inadequately safeguarded.'69
TDU also criticized Holland's decision to give the candidates no
more than a random sample of IBT members' names. 7 ° Judge
Edelstein agreed with the TDU.'7 ' Additionally, he supported TDU's
objection that the IBT leadership was using the International
Teamster to "subvert[] a free and fair election by assailing the
legitimacy and integrity of the Court Officers and damaging the
possibility of reform."'7 2 Judge Edelstein found that the magazine
164. Id.
165. Id. at 106-07.
166. Id. at 106 (stating that the AUD, TDU, and the Government "ask this Court to reaffirm
its earlier broad interpretation of the scope of the Election Officer's duty to 'supervise' the
election").

167. See id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 101.
171. Id. at 101-04.
172. Id. at 102-03.
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had a "fatally biased official editorial posture" against the court and
the court-appointed officers.173 He pointed to the magazine's attacks
on the court-appointed officers' expenditures and to the magazine's
charges that the officers are "constantly seeking to expand their

'powers.'"174

Judge Edelstein's ruling left Holland and his staff with the
unprecedented responsibility of supervising every facet of the most
ambitious rank-and-file union election in U.S. history.'75 The
Teamsters would be one of only a few international unions, and by
far the largest, ever to elect international officers directly.'76
B. Step One: The Delegate Election

1. The Local Union Survey and the
Local Union Election Plans
The requirement that the EO supervise each and every facet of
the election heightened the importance of the local union convention
delegate elections. The EO's Local Union Survey sought to
determine every IBT local's past practice on scheduling and locating
nominating meetings, distributing election notices, and voting
procedures.'77 Ultimately, the EO received 525 "more-or-less
'
complete responses." 178
They revealed "quite divergent experiences"
79
and practices.'
While some locals had a consistent history of
contested elections, others had not had a contested election in
decades.' 0

173. Id. at 103.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 106.
176. The other two unions were much smaller and far more geographically concentrated than
the IBT. Moreover, the Mine Workers and the Steelworkers ceased using nominating
conventions when they adopted direct rank-and-file voting.
177. HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 2, at 3. After sending out the survey by registered mail in
January 1990, the EO staff contacted each local to encourage an accurate and prompt response.
Id. ch. 2, at2.
178. Id. ch. 2, at 3. This number represented slightly more than 80 percent of the surveys
distributed. Of the 126 locals that did not complete the surveys, at least five had been merged
with other locals. Id.
179. Id. ch. 2, at 4.
180. Id. Apportioning delegates to each IBT local was also a complex process. One thousand
nine hundred fifty-eight delegates had to be divided up among 638 locals according to the size of
each local's membership. See id. ch. 2, at 5-6.
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EO Holland required each local union to submit a plan for
electing delegates and alternate delegates to the national
convention.' 8 '
He hired and trained twenty-three regional
coordinators and field staff to review and, if necessary, modify these
plans. 8 2 With a few exceptions, all of the IBT locals' election plans
required some changes.' 83 The EO's most frequent objection was
that a local's rules failed to provide enough time between the
18 4
delegate nominations and the delegate elections.
Holland operated with a presumption against imposing
unfamiliar and complicated election procedures on the locals.'85 He
preferred that the locals adhere to past practice "unless the departure
from past practice afforded an enhanced and freer opportunity for
participation."' 86 The election plan approval process required a
complex determination that took into account each local union's
characteristics. For instance, locals with jurisdiction over a large
geographical area had to provide for delegate nomination meetings in
multiple locations or for written nominations.'87 Most locals
cooperated with the EO's regional coordinators, modifying their
election plans to meet objections, concerns, and recommendations.'88
In July 1990, Holland informed the IBT locals that he would
approve, in most cases,'89 mail balloting for delegate selection. 9 ° In
certain circumstances, he required mail balloting. 9 ' Ultimately, 488
plans (78 percent of locals) provided for a mail-ballot election of

181. Id. ch. 2, at 8.
182. See United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Election Rules Order), 742 F. Supp. 94,
104 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
183. HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 2, at 7-8.
184. Id. ch. 2, at 8.
185. Id. ch. 2, at 12.
186. Id.
187. Id. ch. 2, at 9.

188. Id. ch. 2, at 8.
189. Id. ch. 2, at 10. He made an exception for locals with a history of in-person voting, and
for locals with only one employer and an easily accessible union hall. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. ch. 2, at 11. Four factors informed this decision: (1)history of coercion at the polling
site; (2) size of the local; (3) voter turnout in recent elections; and (4) geographic dispersion. For
example, Alaska's statewide IBT Local 959 would not be allowed to use in-person voting during
the harsh winter months. Id.
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convention delegates. 192 In twenty-three cases, Holland imposed
balloting by mail over the "strenuous" objections of IBT locals.' 93
2. Implementing Procedures for Nominating and
Electing Delegates to the National Convention
The local unions were responsible for providing notice to the
membership of nomination meetings, either by mail, publication in a
union newspaper, or some other method "reasonably calculated to
inform" the membership.' 94
The notice required a regional
coordinator's prior approval. 95 The EO's staff required that notices96
be sent out ten to thirty days prior to the nomination meetings.
They personally attended the nomination meetings at every local;
checked the eligibility of the nominators, the seconders, and the
nominees; and resolved protests. 97
The election rules required that, in order to be eligible to run for
delegate or alternate delegate, a candidate had to be a Teamster
member in "good standing" for twenty-four consecutive months prior
to the nomination meeting.' 98 Good standing required being up to
date with dues and having "active membership status," either by
being employed or actively seeking employment. 9 9 A nominator or
seconder had to be currently in good standing."' 0
To reduce the number of protests over the eligibility of
nominees, nominators, and seconders, the EO's staff strongly
encouraged candidates, nominators, and seconders to submit to
prequalification vetting. 0 ' The EO hired the Center for Economic
Organizing to check dues-payment records and, where necessary, to
obtain relevant information from employers, the union local, and/or
192. Id. ch. 2, at 13. Seventeen locals used both mail-in and in-person voting. Id.
193. Id. The fourteen locals that did not submit any plans had plans imposed upon them. Id.
194. Id. ch. 2, at 15.
195. Id. ch. 2, at 16.
196. Id. ch. 2, at 15.
197. Id. ch. 2, at 17-18.
198. Id.ch. 2, at 18. Sometimes a member falls behind on her dues payment and thus falls
out of good standing because of a prolonged absence from work. When she returns to work, the
employer is supposed to make payroll deductions to bring the employee's union dues up to date.
The employee may be unaware that this did not occur and that she is not a union member in good
standing.

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id.
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the prospective delegate nominee, nominator, or seconder herself.2°2

Ultimately, the EO staff checked the eligibility of over two thousand
candidates for delegate and alternate delegate, and of more than
twelve hundred prospective nominators and seconders. 3
During the delegate election period, 623 locals held 836
nomination meetings."° At least one EO staff member attended
every meeting except two (on account of inclement weather)." 5 IBT
members nominated approximately thirty-two hundred candidates for
delegate and fifteen hundred for alternate delegate.2 °6 At 307 locals
there were contested elections; 316 locals held uncontested "white
ballot" elections.20 7 Interestingly, this represented a slight increase in
the number of "white ballot" elections compared with the most
recent previous local-officer elections, demonstrating that free
elections do not necessarily mobilize voters.2 8 In close to half of
IBT locals, there was no effective challenge to the officers who held
9
the reins of power.

20

The rules permitted members to challenge the eligibility of
delegate nominees, nominators, and nominee seconders no later than
forty-eight hours following the nomination meeting."0 EO staffers in
Washington investigated the challenged Teamster's eligibility status
and presented findings to an EO staff attorney who drafted a
conclusory opinion and recommendation. 21' EO Holland reviewed
the recommendation and rendered the final decision.

202. See id. ch. 2, at 18-20.
203. Id. ch. 2, at 21.
204. See id. ch. 2, at 25.
205. Id.
206. Id. ch. 2, at 26.
207. Id.
208. See id. It is important to note that this comparison might be apples to oranges. The local
union surveys used information on the most recent local-officer elections to establish voting
procedures for convention- delegate elections.

209. Id.
210. Id. ch. 2, at 27.
211. Seeid. ch. 2, at28.
212. Id. while this procedure might seem summary, the only basis for a challenge at this
point was ineligibility: that the member had not been in good standing for the requisite period of
time. The EO staff were present at all but two meetings in order to report irregularities. In those
few meetings where violence or intimidation occurred, Holland placed a candidate's name on the
ballot, ordered a new meeting, or allowed written nominations. See id. ch. 2, at 26-27.
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The regional coordinators subsequently conducted the delegate
elections in accordance with each IBT local's approved plan."' For
the mail-ballot elections, the regional coordinators and field staff
supervised ballot printing and mailing, while affording the
candidates' designated representatives an opportunity to observe the
printing and mailing process." 4
Nearly three hundred thousand members cast ballots in 307
contested IBT local delegate elections." 5 The EO staff had to count
the ballots and resolve any post-election or deferred pre-election
protests that could have affected an election's outcome.2" 6 Prior to
certifying a local's delegate election results, the EO had to determine
whether the total number of challenged ballots was large enough to
have affected the election result; if not, the challenged ballots
remained uncounted.2 1 7 In four cases, the EO ordered a rerun
election: (1) at Local 63, the slates on the printed ballots had been
juxtaposed; (2) at Local 406, after the mail balloting, two winning
delegates were found ineligible; (3) subsequently, at Local 406 a
candidate improperly affixed the local union's insignia to his
campaign literature; the IA reversed the EO's determination of
delegate eligibility; 28 and (4) at Local 886, a candidate's name was
misspelled in a close contest." 9 The EO ordered a recount in every
However, no
case where there was a protest or a recount request.2220
21
election result was changed on account of a recount.
EO Holland reviewed the election reports submitted by the onsite EO staffer, the tally sheet of the votes, the determinations of
eligibility of nominators, seconders, delegates (and alternates), and
voters--consulting the list of officers against whom the IO had filed
disciplinary charges. 22 By June 5, 1991, nearly a year after Judge
213. See id. ch. 2, at 29.
214. See id. ch. 2, at 29-30.
215. Id. ch. 2, at 1.
216. Such protests could arise before the ballot was opened or before an in-person voter cast
her ballot. See id. ch. 2, at 48-49.
217. Id. ch. 2, at 48.
218. Id. ch. 2, at 51-52. The [A reversed the EO's decision because the challenged member
had received pension benefits, which traditionally signals retirement from employment and the
union.
219. Id. ch. 2, at 52.
220. Id. ch. 2, at 53.
221. Id.
222. Id. ch. 2, at 49.
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Edelstein approved the election rules, 223 Holland certified the election
of 1,936 delegates and 1,030 alternate delegates.224
C. Step Two: The Nominating Convention
The 1991 nominating convention in Orlando, Florida was a
watershed in the history of the Teamsters Union, perhaps in the
history of the American labor movement. Over twelve thousand
delegates, alternate delegates, guests, Teamsters officers and
members, and press representatives attended. 225 Judge Edelstein and
his clerks took hotel rooms in Orlando. 226 The delegates nominated
over seventy candidates for sixteen international union positions. 27
The whole process ran smoothly. 28
1. Planning for the Convention
Article IV of the EO's rules required the Election Officer to
supervise all aspects of the nomination process, from convention
planning to verifying and counting ballots.229 At the convention,
delegates made nominations from the floor.2 3' A secret ballot
followed. 3 Those candidates who received at least 5 percent of
delegates votes advanced to the general election ballot. 32
While dealing with the logistics of any large union convention
presents significant challenges, the 1991 IBT convention posed
unusual difficulties because of conflicts within the Teamsters
hierarchy and uncertainty about the EO's role vis-d-vis the Teamsters
officials. 3 As early as August 1990, EO Holland was aware that
convention planning was behind schedule due to bickering between
the offices of General President William McCarthy and Secretary223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. ch. 2, at 50.
Consent Order, supra note 62, at 15.
HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 3, at 1.
Id.

227. Id. ch. 3, at 2.

228. See id. ch. 3, at 2-3.
229. Id. ch. 3, at 3.
230. Id. ch. 3, at 6.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. ch. 3, at 8 ("Differences of opinion between the offices of the General President and
the General Secretary-Treasurer, and the failure to have a single principal and active coordinator
or 'point' person responsible for convention activities during 1990, made coherent planning
impossible.").
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Treasurer Weldon Mathis, as well as to the union's failure to
designate a person to coordinate convention planning. 234 Because
decisions needed to be made, Holland and his staff participated in the
resolution of numerous issues outside the EO's mandate.2 35
The EO often had to prod the IBT and its consultants to make
decisions necessary for the EO's work to proceed.236 IBT officers
frequently invited Holland to participate in decisions that had little to
do with the EO's mandate.23 7 Perhaps due to concern that convention
planning be impartial and/or because the EO proved to be a
competent resource, the IBT sought EO assistance in resolving many
logistical issues.238
Holland had difficulty locating a site within the Dolphin Hotel
where secret-ballot voting could take place.2 39 Because of poor
planning, potentially suitable rooms had been assigned for other
purposes.2 40
Ultimately, the IBT asked the EO to assist in
constructing voting rooms.2 4' To ensure an orderly and efficient
convention, the EO actively participated in resolving issues related to
seating arrangements for delegates, candidates' family and guests,
floor demonstrations, media access, security, and communications
equipment.2 42
The convention's timetable required nominations and balloting
to be conducted on the same day.243 In the morning, there were floor
nominations and candidate speeches.244 Then, ballots were printed.245
In the late afternoon, delegates marked the ballots in secret.246
234. See id. Another early problem was the selection of an appropriate location for secret
balloting. By the fall of 1990, the IBT, still headed by William McCarthy, had not yet
determined how it would use the convention space at the Dolphin Hotel. Id. ch. 3, at 10.
235. Id. ch. 3, at 11.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See id. ch. 3, at 8-12. The EO staff (seventy-five people) maintained for itself the most
visible office space at the convention. Id. ch. 3, at 14-15.
239. Id. ch. 3, at 10.
240. Id. The IBT adopted a space allocation plan produced by the EO staff, convention
consultants, and the hotel convention staff. Id.
241. Id. ch. 3, at 13. A Maryland subcontractor shipped the prefabricated units to the Dolphin
Hotel. Id.
242. Id. ch. 3, at 15-16.
243. Seeid. ch. 3, at 15-17.
244. Id. ch. 3, at 6-7, 15-16.
245. Id. ch. 3, at 6, 16.
246. Id. ch. 3, at 6.
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The rules required that each delegate be a member in good
standing at the time of the convention.247 Starting in mid-May, the
EO's contractor, the Center for Economic Organizing, began
conducting eligibility checks on twenty-seven hundred individuals;
of these, it found twenty-three hundred to be eligible. 248 The Center
kept checking and rechecking eligibility until the first day of the
convention, to make sure that as many delegates as possible could be
seated.249 Ultimately, the EO staff was able to certify the eligibility
of 1,930 of the 1,936 delegates, while requiring five delegates to
bring their dues up to date.25°
Holland also had to deal with some important and tricky issues
regarding press access. At previous conventions, the IBT had not
allowed television cameras on the convention floor. 5' In the run up
to the 1991 convention, CBS sought an order from Judge Edelstein to
gain access to the convention floor in order to film events that would
air on 60 Minutes.252 Judge Edelstein directed the EO to provide the
most liberal possible media access consistent with the orderly
conduct of convention business. 25 3 The EO promulgated rules that
granted the media free access throughout the hotel, except for the
convention-hall floor and voting rooms, where the media had limited
access.

254

2. The $64,000 Question: Could the Rank-and-File
Overturn the Consent Order at the Convention?
In addition to nominating candidates for international union
offices, the convention delegates had to vote on certain IBT
constitutional amendments that had been agreed to by the consentorder signatories.255 On the one hand, the consent order provided that
the Teamsters constitution "shall be deemed and is hereby amended"
247. Id. ch. 3, at 35.
248. Id.
249. Id. ch. 3, at 35-36.
250. Id. ch. 3, at 36.
251. Id. ch. 3, at 41-43. At previous IBT conventions, there were some ugly incidents on the
convention floor. Dissidents who tried to speak or make a nomination were beaten and dragged
from the room. Id. ch. 3, at 61-62.
252. Id. ch. 3, at 42.
253. Id. ch. 3, at 42-43.
254. Id. ch. 3, at 44.
255. Id. ch. 3, at 23.
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to incorporate changes agreed to in the consent order." 6 On the other
hand, the same paragraph provided that, "[b]y no later than the
conclusion of the IBT convention to be held in 1991, the IBT shall
have formally amended the IBT Constitution to incorporate and
conform with all of the terms set forth in this order by presenting
257 "The $64,000 Question 258
said terms to the delegates for a vote.
was: what would occur if the convention delegates rejected some or
all of the EO's election provisions?
Back in March 1989, Assistant U.S. Attorney Randy Mastro told
Judge Edelstein that the U.S. Attorney's Office considered the
constitutional amendments embodied in the consent order to have
become automatically and immediately effective.259 However, at a
congressional hearing a month later, IBT General Counsel James
Grady stated that the convention delegates could reject these
amendments, including the provisions establishing the three courtappointed officers.2 6 ° The issue was further confused when, in April
1989, U.S. Attorney Benito Romano called this matter an unresolved
legal issue.26 '
In his first quarterly report to Judge Edelstein in August, 1989,
Independent Administrator Lacey urged the judge to resolve the
disagreement over the constitutional status of the consent order
provisions. 62 However, Judge Edelstein took no action. 63 In his
fourth quarterly report in July, 1990, Lacey again urged Judge
Edelstein to answer the $64,000 question. 2' Again, Judge Edelstein
declined, and again Lacey did not file a formal application for a court
ruling.265 Finally, in March 1991, the U.S. Attorney's Office, with
the support of IA Lacey and EO Holland, filed an application seeking

256. Consent Order, supra note 62, at 5.
257. Id. at 5-6.
258. It is not clear who first used the expression, but it was widely used. HOLLAND, supra
note 78, ch. 3, at 23.
259. Id. ch. 3, at 24.
260. Id. ch. 3, at 25.
261. Id. ch. 3, at 25; 1989 RICO Hearings, supra note 38, at 18 (testimony of Benito Romano,
U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York).
262. HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 3, at 26.
263. Id.
264. Id. ch. 3, at 27.
265. Id. ch. 3, at 27-29. Under the consent order, the IA, but not the EO, had authority to
make formal applications to the district court. Consent Order, supra note 62, at 18.
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a court order to enjoin the Teamsters national convention from
repealing the consent-order provisions that were added to the IBT
constitution and enjoining the Teamsters from taking any action to
alter the nominating process as set forth by the EO's rules. 66
Judge Edelstein granted the government's motion, reminding the
IBT that it voluntarily had signed the consent order, which called for
free and fair rank-and-file elections:
I tend to be amused when I remember that the IBT by its
representatives have made heroic statements from time to
time to reaffirm their commitment to a union free of
corruption and their dedication to free elections. How I
wish that some of these statements could have been true.
Time has proved, however, that these statements are empty
of any meaning or purpose for the good of this important
union.267

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on June
7, 1991,268 and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on

June 20, 1991, just four days before the convention began.2 69 Thus,
while the consent order authorized the convention delegates to vote
on IBT constitutional amendments imposed by the consent order, the
vote would have no legal effect. Fortunately, for the election-reform
effort, indeed for the whole IBT-remediation project, the convention
delegates, including all the candidates for general president, voted to
accept the constitutional amendments. 7 °
The delay in resolving the status of the constitutional
amendments was a major obstacle to effective convention planning.
As EO Holland noted, "[i]f subordinate entities were not made to
understand that the process in its entirety was inevitable, there would
be greater incentive to ignore the Election Officer or attempt to
impede him and his staff. '2 7' For months, Holland had to navigate
under a cloud of uncertainty.

266. Consent Order, supra note 62, at 18.
267. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 764 F. Supp. 787, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
268. HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 3, at 30.
269. Id.
270. Id. ch. 3, at 31.
271. Id. ch. 3, at 30.
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3. Convention Week
Holland and his staff enforced the IBT constitutional
requirement that IBT locals pay expenses for elected delegates to
attend the convention, unless the local was financially unable to do
so. 2 Holland did not find any local union to be so impecunious.
The convention proceeded smoothly thanks to cooperation
between the EO and IBT staffs, which took joint responsibility for
ensuring that convention participants were properly registered. 74
The IBT staff issued delegate credentials. 275 The EO decided, with
the IBT's support, to expand media access beyond what had been
permitted at past conventions. 76
Every morning when nominations took place, the EO cleared the
floor of all but elected delegates.2 77 A regional coordinator and
security staffer managed access to the floor microphones to ensure
that delegates had a fair opportunity to make nominations.278
Immediately following the nominations, EO staff randomly ordered
the nominees names on the ballots.2 79 After the candidates approved
proofs of the ballots, the two-hour ballot printing process began.28°
At approximately 4:30 p.m., the ballots were delivered to the voting
area. 28 Voting took place from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 282 After
counting the ballots, Holland announced which nominees had
attained the 5 percent threshold necessary to be listed on the general
election ballot.283
The EO was responsible for ensuring that the exhibition hall,
where nominations were made and seconded, would be maintained
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. ch. 3, at 37.
Id.
Id. ch. 3, at 54.
See id.

276. Perhaps one example of the good will that developed during the convention is that the
IBT subsequently appointed to the IRB Grant Crandall, the Regional Coordinator who served as a
liaison between Holland and the various campaigns. Id. ch. 3, at 57.

277. Id. ch. 3, at 58.
278. Id. ch. 3, at 58-59.
279. Id. ch. 3, at 59.
280. Id. Holland could not find a union printer in Orlando who could print the ballots quickly
enough to meet this schedule. Consequently, he established a union print shop at the Dolphin
Hotel. Id. ch. 3, at 18.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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as a politically neutral site. 284 The EQ staff ensured that there were
no partisan signs or banners displayed in politically neutral areas; on
voting days even partisan hats, buttons, t-shirts, and jackets were
prohibited.2 5 They permitted floor demonstrations only for general
president and secretary-treasurer candidates. 2 6
4. The Nominees
The convention nominating procedure produced three slates of
candidates headed by general presidency candidates Ron Carey, R.V
Durham, and Walter Shea. 287 The EO ruled James P. Hoffa, the son
of former General President James Riddle Hoffa (1957-67),288

ineligible because he had not been a Teamster for the requisite
previous two years." 9 Each slate nominated a candidate for
secretary-treasurer and candidates for the fourteen international vice
president positions.29 °
D. Step Three: The General Election

Immediately following the completion of the nominating
convention, the EO focused on two important general election issues.
The first was whether voting in this unprecedented nationwide rankand-file election should be by mail or in person. 29 ' The second was
292
how to determine voter eligibility.
EO Holland opted for mail balloting. 293 During the delegate
election process, 86 percent of locals with contested elections had
used mail balloting, either exclusively or in combination with inperson voting.294 Moreover, mail balloting during the delegate
elections had achieved 33 percent voter participation as compared

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
CROWE,
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. ch. 3, at 39.
Id. ch. 3, at 49.
Id. ch. 3, at 48.
Id. ch. 3, at 65.
CROWE, supra note 18, at 168.
HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 3, at 60-61. For a list of all nominated candidates, see
supra note 18, at 287-88.
HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 3, at 65.
Id. ch. 4, at 2.
Id.
Id. ch. 4, at 3.
Id. ch. 4, at 2-3.
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with 19 percent for in-person voting. 295 None of the interested
TDU, or
parties-the IBT, the three general presidential 29nominees,
7
AUD--objected.

29 6

Judge Edelstein approved it.

Determining voter eligibility-i.e., being up to date on dues
payments and being employed or actively seeking work-was more
complicated. Most members (more than 90 percent) pay dues via a
check-off system whereby employees authorize the employer to
deduct union dues from their paycheck and transmit these dues
directly to the union.298 Under both the Teamsters' constitution and
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,299 a member
cannot be disenfranchised with respect to a union election on account
of an employer's malfeasance or misfeasance in forwarding the
Holland promulgated a voter
required check-off payment.3"'
eligibility test whereby a person was deemed eligible to vote if: (1)
the employee paid Teamster Union dues through a check-off
procedure; and (2) the employer paid the member's dues the last time
the employer sent dues payments to the union.3 1 However, problems
were inevitable because the Teamsters represented workers
employed by nearly forty-five thousand separate employers.3 2 For
example, at Local 732, only 20 percent of the 6,179 members
appeared to meet the constitutional eligibility standards as a result of
employer bankruptcies, historically poor enforcement of3 check-off
3
remittances against employers, and turnover of union staff.
The difficulties of conducting a mail-ballot election for a union
with as many members and as geographically diffused as the
Teamsters can hardly be exaggerated. How would the mail ballots
be distributed? One option would be to make them available at local
union headquarters, but Holland opted to have them mailed to each
member from central headquarters in Washington D.C.3 4 That

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. ch. 4, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. ch. 4, at 5-6.
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2000).

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 4, at 7-8.
Id. ch. 4, at 5.
Id. ch. 4, at 6.
Id. ch. 4, at 4.
See id. ch. 4, at 2.
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decision required an accurate mailing list for more than 1.5 million
Teamsters. The first step was to provide IBT locals with the names
of members with erroneous addresses, based upon return of the
International Teamster as undeliverable.3"5 The locals were able to
correct some of these addresses.3"6 The second (and more costly)
step was to run the remaining erroneous addresses through the U.S.
Postal Service's national change of address database.3 7 The third
step was to request assistance from Teamsters employers, starting
with the largest employer, United Parcel Service ("UPS"), with about
two hundred thousand employees.3 8 In all, the EO staff contacted
350 employers concerning eighty thousand problematic residential
addresses.3 9
The EO selected security specialist Joe Loesche 311 to ensure
ballot security.31 Loesche assigned security personnel to the four
printing and mailing facilities in Cleveland, Chicago, Ottawa, and
Toronto, as well to the Washington, D.C. ballot counting site. 32 To
prevent forgery, the color of ballots for each region was not revealed
until the day printing began.31 3 The voters received and returned
ballots in nested envelopes. 314 As the first ballots arrived, they were
stored in a ballot security room with twenty-four-hour security
guards. 3 5 The candidates could designate observers to stay with the
ballots.316
The rules permitted candidate observers to monitor each step of
the counting process. 317 This meant that three observers, one from
305. Id. ch. 4, at 17-20.
306. See id. ch. 4, at 19-20.
307. Id. ch. 4, at 20-21.
308. Id. ch. 4, at 22.
309. Id. ch. 4, at 24. Updating the Teamsters membership list ensured maximum participation
in the 1991 election and would also aid the Teamsters in membership communication for years to
come. See id. ch. 4, at 17-27.
310. Loesche had formerly been director of security for the United Auto Workers and deputy
superintendant of police in Detroit, Michigan. Id. ch. 3, at 21.
311. Id.
312. Id. ch. 4, at 44-45.
313. Id. ch. 4, at 15-16.
314. See id.ch. 4, at 93.
315. Id. ch. 4, at 46.
316. The two Durham observers maintained a daily, twenty-four-hour watch on the ballots,
literally sleeping in the room with the ballots. Id. ch. 4, at 46-47.
317. Id. ch. 4, at 55.
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each slate, could observe each count station."' The ballot was
contained inside a ballot envelope that itself sat inside a businessreply envelope, the outside of which contained a code that, for
eligibility purposes, identified the voter. The first work station
checked eligibility. 19 Any ballot challenged by a candidate's
observer was returned to the ballot security room; its validity would
be resolved only if, after the votes were counted, the total number of
challenged ballots could alter the election's outcome.32°
At the first station, an election worker could challenge a ballot
based on the condition of the envelope.32 ' An improperly sealed
envelope posed a risk that the member was not the person who filled
in the ballot. At station two, a slitter machine opened the businessreply envelope. At station three, a ballot counter removed the sealed
ballot envelope from the outer envelope.322 Any marking on the
sealed ballot envelope that disclosed the voter's identity voided the
ballot 323 At station four, another slitter machine opened the ballot. 4
At station five, count workers extracted the ballots and determined
whether the optical scanning machine could read the ballot. 25 If the
ballot was torn or crumpled, count workers at another station
"remade" the ballot by copying the information from the voter's
ballot to a clean ballot.3 26 If the ballot was incorrectly filled out (e.g.,
bubbles not completely filled in), count workers remarked the
ballot.327 This procedure generated the most disputes because it
required discerning the voter's intent. After all ballots from a local
union were processed, they were taken to a ballot-tabulation room to
be run through the optical scanning machine.32
In all, 396,172 Teamsters, representing 28.2 percent of the
eligible membership, cast ballots.329 Of these, 11,372 ballots were
318. See id.
319. Id. ch. 4, at 92.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Id. ch. 4, at 93, 100, 102.
Id. ch. 4, at 92-93.
Id. ch. 4, at 94.
Id.

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id. ch. 4, at
See id.
Id. ch. 4, at
Id.
Id. ch. 4, at
Id. ch. 4, at

95.
98.
100.
106.
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voided on account of voter error in marking or mailing.33 °
Furthermore, 17,125 challenged ballots were never counted because
they could not affect the election's outcome."'
E. Protests and Appeals to the Election Officer
and Certificationof the Election
During the 1990-1991 election, members and candidates sent
over 1,500 protests to headquarters.332 Of those, 250 concerned the
eligibility of individual members to participate in the delegate
nomination process.333 There were only two challenges to a
nominated candidate's eligibility.334
EO Holland sought to resolve pre-convention and pre-generalelection challenges as swiftly as possible. By resolving a disputed
matter prior to the election, the EO "prevented the wrongful pre335
election conduct from affecting the results of an election.
Resolving disputes early could prevent the need for a re-run election.
Protests had to be filed in writing at EO headquarters in
Washington, D.C. All protests regarding a specific delegate election
were consolidated under a single case number. 336 Eligibility protests,
assigned to EO central-office attorneys, usually did not require field
investigation because they generally related to being up to date on
dues payments. The EO assigned other protests to the regional
coordinator responsible for the area from which the protest arose; the
regional coordinator could enlist the assistance of adjunct
coordinators to conduct field investigations.337
Three elements of the protest process need emphasizing. First,
all investigations began with a formal protest by a Teamster member;
the EO staff did not initiate investigations or investigate anonymous
tips. 338 Second, the EO staff did not have a specially designated
investigations team.
The regional coordinators and adjunct

330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. ch. 6, at 8.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id.
Id.
Id. ch. 6, at 3.
Id. ch. 6, at 32-33.
Id. ch. 6, at 36.
See id. ch. 6, at 32-33.
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coordinators conducted the investigations.339 The most frequent
protests were charges of employer campaign interference.34 Third,
protests were resolved without hearings, so they could be resolved
expeditiously, preventing members and locals from being
"'
The rules required members to file protests
disenfranchised.34
within two days of the day the protestor became aware, or reasonably
should have become aware, of the protested action. 42 The EO then
had five days to investigate and make a decision.343 In the event of
an appeal, the Independent Administrator had three days to conduct a
hearing and two additional days to render a decision.344
In the 1991 election, there were seventy-six post-election
'
Seventy-four of those related to
protests, known as "post protests."345
delegate selection and two to the international election.346 Because
"post protests" only had to be considered if cumulatively they could
have affected an election result, -most of these were not investigated
or resolved.347 Twenty convention-related protests involved disputes
about local unions refusing to pay the expenses of elected
delegates.348 Protests over "P cases" involved disputes about all
other pre-election matters.349
The protests and their resolutions fill twenty-eight volumes. The
following examples illustrate the most frequent types: employer
protests, local union protests, and campaign finance protests.
1. Protests Against Employers' Conduct
The largest number of protests dealt with challenges to
employers' actions that allegedly interfered with the union
candidates' campaigning. The EO found these protests meritorious
more frequently than protests over campaign interference by union
339. Id. ch. 6, at 36.
340. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (1996 Election Rules), 896 F. Supp. 1349, 1360
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
341. See HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 6, at 4.
342. 1996 Election Rules, 896 F. Supp. at 1359.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Id. at 1360.
Id.
Id.
See HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 6, at 8.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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officials, members, and other individuals.35° Complaints alleged 314
campaign violations against 122 different employers. 35 ' The most
frequent charges against employers were: (1) failure to provide union
candidates access to the employer's property; and (2) retaliation
against an employee for engaging in union campaign activities.352
The final election rules included rules on workplace access even
though employers were not parties to the consent order.353
It was certainly not obvious that the EO could exert authority
over employers who were not and could not have been parties to the
RICO suit. However, a fair election would not be possible if
employers allied themselves with one faction (usually the incumbent
regime). The legal issue came to a head in a protest involving
Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.354 The Carey campaign alleged that the
employer blatantly supported Durham, while preventing TDU and
Carey's supporters from communicating with Yellow Freight's
employees.355 With respect to the Detroit site, EO Holland ruled that
Carey had a reasonable way to communicate with IBT members off
company property.356 However, with respect to the Chicago Ridge
protest, Holland found no reasonable alternative and therefore
ordered Yellow Freight Systems to provide union candidates with
access to the company's property. 57 Yellow Freight appealed to the
Independent Administrator on the grounds that: (1) the EO did not
have jurisdiction over employers; (2) the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") had exclusive jurisdiction to regulate candidate
access to employer property; and (3) the EO's factual findings did
not have a reasonable basis in fact.358 The Independent Administrator
upheld the EO's ruling.359

350. Id. ch. 4, at 11.
351. Id. ch. 6, at 11.
352. See id. ch. 6, at 19-20.
353. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (1996 Election Rules), 896 F. Supp. 1349,
1364-67 (S.D.N.Y.1995).
354. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Yellow FreightI) 948 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1991);
see also HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 6, at 17-19.
355. Yellow FreightII, 948 F.2d 98; see also HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 6, at 17-19.
356. Yellow Freightll, 948 F.2d at 100-01.
357. Id.
358. See id. at 101-02.
359. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Yellow Freight1), No. 88 Civ. 4486, 1991 WL
51065, at *I (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1991).
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Yellow Freight then appealed to Judge Edelstein, who ruled that
Yellow Freight, though not bound by the consent order, was subject
to his All Writs Act injunction.36 He reasoned that jurisdiction over
employers was necessary to achieve the court's goal of enforcing
free and fair IBT elections: the union incumbents' advantage could
only be neutralized by allowing all candidates access to employer
work sites. 6 ' Judge Edelstein rejected the contention that the NLRB
possessed exclusive jurisdiction, holding that the NLRB could not
have exclusive jurisdiction since it the All Writs Act injunction
prevented the NLRB from hearing disputes emanating from the
consent order.362 Moreover, the consent order was derived from a
RICO suit and not from a suit brought under the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA").363 Judge Edelstein also held that he would
affirm the IA's decisions on employer protests unless they were
arbitrary and capricious."
The Second Circuit upheld Judge Edelstein's decision relating to
the All Writs Act injunction and the NLRA.365 However, it
remanded on the issue of whether the IBT candidate who filed the
protest had a reasonable alternative means for communicating with
the company's Chicago Ridge employees.366 Holland later noted:
"Such decisions permitted direct campaigning among IBT members,
at the facilities where they worked; such campaigning proved to be
one of the most effective campaign devices utilized by any
candidate."367
On the same day that it decided Yellow Freight II, the Second
Circuit upheld another important Judge Edelstein election ruling.368
Neal Henderson, a member of Boston Local 25, had been employed
by Star Market as a warehouseman for almost fifteen years.369 His
360. Id. at *4.
361. Id. at*3.
362. Id. at *3-4. The National Labor Relations Act guarantees union members a limited right
of access to employers' premises. Id. at *3 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)).
363. Id. at *4; National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
364. Yellow Freightl,1991 WL 51065, at *2.
365. See United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Yellow FreightI), 948 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir.

1991).
366.
367.
368.
369.
1991).

Id. at 107-08.
HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 6, at 19.
United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 954 F.2d 801, 804 (2d Cir. 1992).
United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Star Market), 776 F. Supp. 144, 147 (S.D.N.Y.
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IBT local elected him as a convention delegate committed to Ron
Carey's slate.370

He alleged that his employer terminated him

because of his post-convention support for Carey.37' Holland found
that such retaliation violated the election rules and ordered Star
Market to reinstate Henderson with back pay.372 When Star Market
refused to comply with the order, the U.S. Attorney asked the district
court to enforce the EO's order.373 Judge Edelstein held that Star
Market waived all arguments by failing to appeal directly to the EO
and that Yellow Freight I dictated a decision in Henderson's favor
because the All Writs Act injunction covered Star Market.374 Judge
Edelstein's and the Second Circuit's opinions in Star Market, in
effect, gave the court-appointed officers the power to protect union
insurgents against retaliation by employers who might be
sympathetic or beholden to the union's dominant faction.375
The EO's final election rules and interpretive decisions also
dealt with posting campaign material on workplace bulletin boards.
If the boards were previously available to union members, the EO
prohibited the employer from curtailing their use by IBT election
candidates.7
A related issue involved supporters of competing
candidates removing or defacing the opposition's campaign notices
and advertisements. The IA ordered employers to divide their
bulletin boards in order to provide space for all candidates.377 In
some cases, regional coordinators actually drew dividing lines on the
boards.378
Yet another line of cases guaranteed candidate-employees
access to their own workplaces for campaigning during non-work
hours, regardless of the availability of a reasonable alternative.379 IA
Lacey ruled that employers had to allow candidates to campaign in
370. Id.
371. Id. at 148.

372. Id.
373. Id. at 148-49.
374. Id. at 150. Star Market argued before the Second Circuit that the EO's and Independent
Administrator's hearings violated due process and contravened an existing arbitration agreement.
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 954 F.2d at 804.
375. Id.; Star Market, 776 F. Supp. at 154.
376. HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 6, at 29-30.

377. Id. ch. 6, at 30.
378. Id.
379. Id. ch. 6, at 30-31.
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outdoor areas, such as parking lots, and that candidates access to the
work site itself during non-work time could only be restricted under
stringent guidelines."'
2. Protests Against Local Unions
Recognizing that the workplace is the best place for union
candidates to contact union members,"' the EO's election rules
required local unions to provide candidates with information about
Delay in providing this
their members' work locations.382
information was "tantamount to denial to the candidate of his ability
'
When a local did not comply with this rule, the EO
to campaign."383
took swift remedial action. For instance, EO Holland required Local
705 to mail the candidates' campaign literature to all its members.384
He also ordered Local 710, where delay occurred earlier in the
election period, to prepare and distribute the candidates' literature at
the IBT members' work sites.385
The EO took responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the mail
balloting process. The primary risks to the integrity of mail balloting
are that: (1) a ballot may be filled in by someone other than the
member to whom it belongs; and (2) voters are coerced. These risks
are illustrated by a protest arising from Local 63's mail-ballot
election for delegates and alternate delegates. Two slates contested
the election; one was committed to Ron Carey, and the other was
The protest alleged that Local 63 officers
uncommitted. 86
themselves solicited and filled out some voters' mail ballots. 387 The
EO appointed a special investigatory team to make unannounced
work site visits to interview Local 63 members. 38 The investigation
380. See id.
381. Id. ch. 6, at 22. Holland explained that: "Numerous members could be contacted in a
relatively short period of time. When at work-or travelling to and from work-members were
more likely to be receptive to receiving campaign message which, after all, affect their working
conditions. During such periods, they were not distracted by familial or similar obligations.
Moreover, face-to-face campaigning was more effective and less expensive than mailings or
telephoning." Id.
382. Id. ch. 6, at 21.
383. Id. ch. 6, at 23.
384. Id. ch. 6, at 23-24.
385. Id. ch. 6, at 24.
386. Id. ch. 6, at 26.
387. Id. ch. 6, at 27.
388. Id.
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revealed that at least some ballots were filled out by Local 63
officers and business agents. 389 Although the members of the
winning slate themselves were not implicated, their supporters
were. 9 Finding the election to be the "fruits of that poisonous tree,"
the EO disqualified the entire slate and certified the Carey Slate.39 '
After the early, swift, and strong reaction to this type of election
fraud, the EO found no further evidence of similar conduct during
either the delegate or general elections. 92
3. Campaign Finance
Campaign financing is critical in union elections as it is in
elections for governmental offices. This is especially true for an IBT
election in which candidates have to communicate their message to
voters all across the United States and Canada. Donations from
outside the union could easily influence the election, but raising
enough money from union members to finance a nationwide
campaign is a daunting challenge, especially for insurgents who lack
name recognition and patronage to dispense.
The consent order prohibited IBT candidates from receiving
campaign contributions from non-IBT members:
No candidate for election shall accept or use any
contributions or other things of value received from any
employers, representative of an employer, foundation, trust
or any similar entity. Nothing herein shall be interpreted to
prohibit receipt of contributions from fellow employees and
members of this International Union. Violation of this
provision shall be grounds for removal from office.393
This prohibition supplemented federal labor law, which prohibits
unions from making contributions or providing benefits to candidates
on an unequal basis and which prohibits labor organizations from
making contributions to candidates and campaigns in other unions. 394
Federal labor law also prohibits employer representatives from

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

Id.
Id. ch. 6, at 28.
Id.
See id.
Consent Order, supra note 62, at 5.
See HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 15, at 2.
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contributing to union candidates' campaigns and, to prevent
corruption, from making any gifts to union representatives.395
The election rules aimed to make IBT-campaign financing more
transparent. Campaign donations would have to be reported and
available for all candidates to review. Violations could be punished
by fines and even removal from office.396
With respect to the consent order's campaign finance provision,
several election protests required the EO to interpret "employer,"
'
The latter
"labor organization," and "campaign contributions."397
entities
IBT
prohibited
EO
generated the most controversy. The
from endorsing IBT candidates on the ground that an endorsement is
a "material thing of value" and therefore a campaign contribution.398
Indeed, an EO advisory stated that endorsements, solicitations of
endorsements, and certain volunteer work all constitute campaign
contributions.3 99
The Durham slate filed an election protest against the Teamsters
for a Democratic Union on account of TDU's support for Ron
Carey.4"' It argued that TDU should be prohibited from supporting
(by endorsements, financial contributions, or labor) Ron Carey
because TDU received financial contributions from the Teamster
Rank and File Education and Legal Defense Fund ("TRF," a TDU
entity that solicits donations from non-Teamsters), which, in turn,
received contributions from non-IBT members, who are prohibited
from contributing to IBT candidates.4 "1
EO Holland ruled in favor of TDU and Carey, indicating for
some critics Holland's bias in favor of Carey.4"2 Holland ruled that
395. See id. ch. 15, at 1-2.
396. See id. ch. 15, at 3-4.
397. See id. ch. 15, at4-5.
398. Id. ch. 15, at 5.
399. See id. ch. 15, at 6.
400. See id. ch. 6, at 15. Independent committees were groups comprised solely of IBT
members not directly affiliated with a candidate or slate, but actively supporting one or more
candidates. TDU was an important example. See id. Breaking with previous practice, TDU
endorsed Ron Carey for general president and organized rallies on his behalf. See id. ch. 6, at 1517.
401. See id. ch. 6, at 15-16. TDU was founded in 1976 by Teamsters concerned about
"corruption, lack of leadership accountability to the membership, undemocratic procedures, and
unfair, ineffective, and even ill-intentioned bargaining and grievance adjustment strategies."
United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (TDU/TRF Disclosure), 968 F.2d 1506, 1508 (2d Cir.
1992). See also LA BOTZ, supra note 157.
402. HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 6, at 15-17.
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TDU could support candidates in the IBT election as long as it
maintained an accounting system that assured that its election
expenditures were funded exclusively with money from persons or
entities who themselves could legally contribute to candidates. 3
This decision provided a green light for the Teamster National Black
Caucus and the Teamster Hispanic Caucus to contribute to Durham's
campaign. 4
Holland ordered TDU and TRF to file reports identifying
contributors of more than $100 and to disclose those reports to
international union candidates.4 5 Such disclosure was necessary
because of "the possibility . . . that the campaign contribution
limitations of the Consent Order and the Rules may be breached."' 40 6
Therefore, Holland ordered independent committees, specifically
including TDU and TRY, to disclose their donations.4 7
After Judge Edelstein affirmed Holland's decision, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the disclosure order until it could
rule on the merits.4 8 Ultimately, after the 1991 election was over,
the Second Circuit ruled in favor of TDU on two grounds: (1) TDU
was not bound by the consent order because the IBT officers who
signed the consent order did not represent TDU; 49 and (2) because
TDU was not attempting to frustrate the consent order's
implementation, it was not in violation of the All Writs Act
injunction.

403. Id. ch. 6, at 16.
404. Id. ch. 6, at 17.
405. See TDU/TRF Disclosure, 968 F.2d at 1508.
406. Id. at 1509.
407. See id. TDU and TRF opposed disclosure because their members had faced retaliation
including "brutal physical attacks, arson, threats of physical harm, and economic reprisals ....
"
Id. at 1508. TDU and TRF offered to provide the EO with any information relevant to
investigations of campaign finance violations. See id. at 1509.
408. See HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 15, at 16.
409. See TDU/TRF Disclosure, 968 F.2d at 1511.
410. See id. at 1511-12. Judge Edelstein ruled that employers, while nonparties to the
litigation, could frustrate the consent order and therefore were subject to the All Writs Act
injunction. TDU voluntarily complied with the EO's reporting requirements and in no way
interfered with the implementation of the consent order. The Second Circuit specifically did not
address the question of whether the All Writs Act injunction could extend to TDU in the absence
of voluntary compliance. Id. at 1512. The candidates spent approximately $3.8 million in the
election. HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 15, at 12.
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F. The Candidatesand the 1991 Election
The 1991 rank-and-file election of the IBT's international
officers was a watershed event in the history of the union.
Historically, the Teamsters' General Executive Board and its
organized-crime allies selected the IBT international president.41 1
The next convention then unanimously affirmed the GEB's choice.4 12
1. The Candidates
The three candidates for IBT general president in the 1991
election were Ron Carey, R.V. Durham, and William Shea.413 Ron
Carey was president of Local 804, which represents UPS workers in
the metropolitan New York City area. 4
In his 1993 book on the Teamsters, labor journalist Kenneth
Crowe called Carey a strong, dedicated, and competent IBT official,
who offered an alternative to the labor racketeers who dominated the
international union.4" 5 He opined that "[i]f the Teamsters ever were
to change ... it would take a person like Carey to do it."4 6 Crowe
praised Carey for "carefully accounting for every dollar of the
members' money and preventing anyone else in the local from
playing the dirty game of kickbacks and shakedowns that had
'
destroyed the reputation of the IBT."417
Carey had opposed the previous three national UPS contracts.418
A majority of UPS workers nationwide had rejected the 1998
contract, but the IBT still agreed to it, a two-thirds membership vote
being required to defeat the GEB's approval of a national contract.41 9
Carey clearly was the candidate of change who could break the
incumbent regime's multi-decade control of the IBT.42 ° Carey ran

411. For example, the GEB selected Jackie Presser as general president when Roy Williams
resigned after being convicted. The GEB selected William McCarthy as general president after
Jackie Presser died. See JACOBS, supra note 7, at 44.
412. CROWE, supra note 18, at 159.
413. HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 3, at 65.
414. See STEVEN BRILL, THE TEAMSTERS 156 (1978).
415. See CROWE, supra note 18, at 130-31.
416. Id. at 135.
417.
418.
419.
420.

Id. at 130.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 169.
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with TDU's strong backing, but he was not a TDU member and
sought not to be defined as TDU's candidate.4 2'

Carey's candidacy got a huge boost when the incumbent IBT
regime was unable to coalesce around a single candidate.422 In fact,
there was a major schism among the leadership after Jackie Presser
stepped down in 1988 on account of illness.423 Secretary-Treasurer
Weldon Mathis became acting president but lost the position when

the General Executive Board selected Vice President William
McCarthy in the summer of 1988.424
International Vice President R.V. Durham announced his
candidacy for general president after incumbent President William
McCarthy decided not to run. 425

Durham, also president of IBT

Local 391, received the support of a majority of the GEB, who saw
him as carrying on the policies and apparatus of the McCarthy
administration. 426 Durham defined himself as a steadfast fighter for
the rights of truck drivers. 427 Despite the GEB's support for Durham,
International Vice President Walter Shea also chose to run.42t While

Shea had been an international vice president for a decade, he had no
political base within the IBT. 429 He joined the union as a researcher
for the IBT's Eastern Conference.43° In the ensuing years, he held
several IBT administrative positions, finally serving as the union's

421. Id. at 144-45. Carey attended the TDU convention and accepted its endorsement and
support, but emphasized throughout his campaign that the TDU was just one of several
organizations whose endorsement he welcomed. One Carey campaign aide noted: "The downside
is that for years Teamster leaders have been pounding it into the members that TDU is a bunch of
complainers, dissidents, communists, employer representatives. A litany of propaganda [that
was] tagged onto Ron [Carey]." Id. Nonetheless, Carey did run with some TDU members on his
ticket, such as Diana Kilmury, who would become the first woman ever to serve on the GEB. See
id. at 180.
422. Id. at 129-68
423. Id. at 78, 83
424. Id. at 86-89. Subsequently, five members of the GEB sued McCarthy and Mathis for
retaliation on account of being stripped of their jobs for their support of Walter Shea in the 1991
election. Id. at 186; Shea v. McCarthy, 953 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
425. CROWE, supra note 18, at 153.
426. Id. at 153-54.
427. Durham convinced Congress to act to ensure that the cab sizes, where drivers sit, did not
shrink pursuant to state regulation. He famously drove a small cab up to Capitol Hill; Senator
Ted Kennedy sat down in it to demonstrate the discomfort. Id. at 156-69.
428. Id. at 159-60.
429. Id. at 165-66.
430. Id. at 162.
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administrator

in

Washington

D.C.43 '

The

GEB

frontrunner.432

The delegates at the
endorsement made Durham the
1,001 delegate
Orlando convention confirmed his lead; he received
4
11
289.
Carey's
and
574
votes, compared to Shea's
2. The Campaign
Carey ran against what he derisively called "concessionary
bargaining" and weak contracts.434 By contrast, he claimed to have

delivered strong contracts for his local in New York.435 Carey argued
that corruption and the perception that the leaders of the Teamsters
were lining their own pockets diminished the union's bargaining
power. He insisted that a union dedicated to its members, not to its
leaders, would deliver better contracts.4 36

Durham presented himself as a leader who had already produced
results, most notably, protecting the health and safety of truckers.437
He claimed the reformer's mantel by supporting the consent order
provision that established direct elections; he also proposed a
permanent, independent ethics review committee.438 Shea defined
himself as a competent and honest administrator. 439 His campaign,
however, had little resonance with the rank-and-file.44 °
The 1991 campaign was marked by negative campaigning. EO
Holland required the International Teamster to give each slate nine
pages of space in its September, October, and November issues. 44'
Carey chose to display a picture of a group of pigs feeding at a
trough filled with dollar bills. The caption said: "They're feasting on
your dues!"" 2 The ads had been prepared by November Group, a
Washington-based political marketing firm, which was later

431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.

Id. at 156, 162-66.
Id. at 181-82.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 142.
Id.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 180, 189, 194.
Id. at224.
Id. at 225.
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implicated in the campaign finance violations that led to Carey's
expulsion from the IBT.443
Durham used his space to attack Shea for never having been a
working Teamster or a local union officer. He accused Carey of
having been a "scab" (i.e., a worker who crosses picket lines, a strike
breaker). 4' He also excoriated Carey for cooperating with federal
investigators in the investigation and prosecution of a member of
Carey's local.445 Carey's team tried to capitalize on Carey's
reputation for fighting corruption: "Ron Carey did not hesitate to
force a Local 804 official caught in wrongdoing out of office. '' 446
Durham sought to define Carey as the TDU candidate, hoping to
sway many Teamsters who regarded TDU negatively.447 One letter
that Durham distributed to union officials and employees in the
Marble Palace raised the (presumably frightening) specter that "we
could wake up one morning to find Ron Carey TDU president of the
IBT. ' '44 8 A month later, Durham stated, "TDU's outright lies and
deceptions, coupled with the antiunion media's distortions, have
fired up Carey's supporters. '449 Durham's ads accused Carey of
being "Mr. Immunity" for allegedly cutting a deal with the
government to testify against fellow Local 804 member John Long.450
Durham also made the baseless accusation: "Scabbing on a
Teamsters strike is as low as you can go. Ron Carey scabbed on a
UPS strike. 451
In the October issue, Carey sought to reinforce his message that
he would purge the racketeers who had victimized the union for
decades. 52 In the International Teamster, he placed a picture of

443. Id. at 224-25.
444. Id.
445. John Long and Ron Carey were colleagues and rivals within Local 804; Carey served as
president and Long as secretary-treasurer. Long was convicted in Judge Edelstein's court for
taking a $9,000 payoff. Subsequently, U.S. Attorney Giuliani argued that the civil RICO suit
against the IBT was related to the Long conviction, so it would be heard by Edelstein. Id. at 13738.
446. Id. at 225-26.
447. Id. at251-52.
448. Id.at 251.
449. Id. at 251-52.
450. Id. at 225.
451. Id. at 226.
452. Id.
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Durham standing arm-in-arm with a convict in chains and with a
machine-gun-toting gangster.453
The government's remedial strategy was predicated on the belief
that, if given an opportunity, the Teamsters rank-and-file would
choose an honest leader over a corrupt organized-crime-backed
leader.454 Durham himself had not been charged with specific
wrongdoing or improper alliance with organized crime, but in the
minds of many people who wanted drastic change in the IBT, he was
guilty by association.455 In fact, three vice presidential candidates on
his slate were charged with wrongdoing.456 In the midst of the
campaign, the Investigations Officer charged Robert Sansone with
failing to investigate a member of his local's organized-crime ties. 57
Six weeks before the mail-in ballot deadline, the Carey
campaign had enough money to mail a small pamphlet to 650,000
members.458 The pamphlet's cover showed a cigar-smoking gangster
wearing a Durham slate button.459 The caption asked, "Guess who
46
The pamphlet's first page provided the
runs the Teamsters?""
answer: "Starting Now, You Do."46 ' The "Carey Promise" had four
prongs: "1. Throw out the Mafia, 2. Better Pensions, 3. Better Health
Care, and 4. Stop Corruption. 4 62 The pamphlet stated that three

members of the Durham Slate had been charged with "corruption,
kickbacks and mafia ties. 463 It charged "Old Guard leaders" with
destroying the union and criticized Durham and his wife and son for
drawing multiple IBT salaries.4"
When the mail ballots were counted, Carey had 188,883 votes,
Durham 129,538, and Shea 71,222.465 The result was widely
453. Id.
454. Id. at 246.
455. Id. at 249.
456. Id. at 225-26.
457. Id. at 229.
458. Id. at 251.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. It was common practice for international IBT officers to draw salaries from locals, joint
councils, and area conferences, as well as from the international union. When they retired, they
also drew multiple pensions. Id.
465. Id. at 259.
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regarded and heralded as an enormous victory for the government
and TDU. Some saw it as a historic turning point for the entire U.S.
labor movement. 466 The New York Times rhetorically asked, "Can It
Be Morning in Teamsterland? '467 Chris Scott, who at the time was
the President of the North Carolina AFL-CIO, mused, "[i]n five
years it is conceivable that Carey is so popular that he makes Jimmy
468
Hoffa look like a footnote in history.
3. The Carey Years: 1992-1997
Carey promised the IBT membership: "a new Teamster
union.... The union that's been won back by its members. The
union that's going to work for its members. A union that will not be
tolerating corruption. ' 469
He stood by his pledge to end
concessionary bargaining by maintaining a hard line against a
Pennsylvania trucking company that demanded a concessionary
contract, including a 22 percent wage cut.47 ° Carey stood firm even
though it led to the company's bankruptcy and to the unemployment
of the three hundred employees.471
Carey sold the union's jets and put together a budget with strict
spending controls.4 When Carey took office, he cut his own salary
by $75,000 to $173,000 per year and reduced all top officers' pay.473
He dissolved the four area conferences, purportedly saving more than
$11 million.474
However, the IBT's financial situation was precarious. The
1991 convention had voted to increase weekly strike benefits from
$55 to $200 without providing a way to pay for it.475 At the end of a

466. Id.
467. Jonathan Tasini, Can It Be Morning in Teamsterland?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1991, at
A39.
468. CROWE, supra note 18, at 258.
469. Id. at 258.
470. Id. at 265.
471. Id.
472. Id. at 266.
473. Gregory S. Johnson, Crunch Time for Carey: Embattled Presidentof Teamsters Faces
DepletedStrike Fund,Rampant Spending, J. COM., Jan. 9, 1995, at 79.
474. Carey: End "Real Teamster" Caucus, TRAFFIC WORLD, Oct. 16, 1995, at 45.
475. See Johnson, supra note 473.
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major 1994-95 truckers' strike, the IBT's strike fund was almost
exhausted. Carey reduced the weekly strike benefit back to $55.476
A three-week nationwide truckers' strike in April completely
depleted the fund; 477 it paid out $28 million in one strike478 and $100
million in total.4 79 Carey's administration was saddled with an
expensive pension system that had to pay pensions to local union
officials who were already receiving pensions from their local
unions; that double-dipping cost the union $34 million before Carey
ended it in 1994.480 In addition, by the end of 1995, the IBT had
spent $12 million for the salaries and expenses of the court-appointed
officers serving pursuant to the consent order.481 One political
opponent's campaign literature referred to him as Ron "Ca$h &

Carey. g482
In advance of the truckers' strike and for the first time in IBT
history, Carey put a dues increase up for a rank-and-file vote.483 In
retrospect, this turned out to be a huge mistake. The proposal lost by
a 3-to-i margin.4 84 After the truckers' strike, Carey signed a new
National Master Freight Agreement, covering all the union's freight
481
Many members expressed disappointment with the
carriers.
outcome, which froze part-time pay, eliminated overtime for dock
workers, and enabled freight carriers to move more freight
intermodally, i.e., a combination of train and truck requiring fewer
hours for truck drivers.486

476. John D. Schulz, Hard Times at the Teamsters Union: $100,000 Club Dwindles to 145
Officers, TRAFFIC WORLD, Aug. 7, 1995, at 15.
477. Johnson, supra note 473.
478. John D. Schulz, Hoffa Preparing '96 Challenge to Carey, TRAFFIC WORLD, Jan. 23,
1995, at 14.
479. Janet Moore, Hoffa Son Visits City, Evokes Memories: Teamsters Candidate Seeking to
Follow Father Into Union Presidency,AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 21, 1995, at C6.
480. Id.
481. See id.

482. Jill Hodges, Hoffa Brings His Bid to Head Teamsters to Minnesotans, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR TRIB., May 30, 1996, at ID.
483. William Flannery, Teamsters Dealing with Dues, Labor Pact, ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, Mar. 30, 1994, at 7C.

484. Id.
485. See Johnson, supra note 473.
486. Id.
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Carey could claim some successes. In 1995, the union gained
nearly 4,000 members, halting a sixteen-year decline.487 Meanwhile,
the Teamsters' lobbying efforts paid off when it convinced the
Clinton administration to delay implementation of provisions of the
North American Free Trade Agreement that would have allowed
trucks from Mexico to haul freight into the United States.488
IV. THE 1996 ELECTION DEBACLE: THE FALL OF RON CAREY

The 1996 election promised to be highly competitive because of
the candidacy of James P. Hoffa, whose name alone made him a
formidable candidate. His father, Jimmy (James Riddle) Hoffa, was
one of the most charismatic labor leaders in U.S. history. 489 His
presumed assassination by mafia figures only added to his notoriety.
Hoffa's long and complex association with organized crime made
him anathema to union reformers.49 ° Inevitably then, some people
feared that a James P. Hoffa general presidency would mean a return
to the old days of labor racketeering. 49 ' That fear was reinforced by
the support Hoffa immediately received from individuals and
families with ties to his father.492

487. See John D. Schulz, Teamsters Reverse Membership Decline; Start 'NAFTA Highway
Safety Alert', TRAFFIC WORLD, Mar. 4, 1996, at 18. This membership increase was largely due

to the growth of UPS, the Teamsters' largest employer. See id.
488. See id.
489. See Steven Greenhouse, Once Again, the Hoffa Name Rouses the Teamsters' Union,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, at 1. For a full account of the elder Hoffa's involvement with the
union see WALTER SHERIDAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF JIMMY HOFFA (1972); DAN E. MOLDEA,
THE HOFFA WARS: TEAMNSTERS, REBELS, POLITICAINS, AND THE MOB (1978); LESTER VELIE,
DESPERATE BARGAIN: WHY JIMMY HOFFA HAD TO DIE (1977); ARTHUR A. SLOANE, HOFFA
(1991); THADDEUS RUSSELL, OUT OF THE JUNGLE: JIMMY HOFFA AND THE REMAKING OF THE
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (2001).
490. See generally JACOBS, supra note 7, at 264-65 n. 30 (listing sources that detail Hoffa's
associations).
491. See, e.g., Stanley Holmes, Son of Hoffa Seeks to Rule Divided Teamsters, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1996, at Al (describing the differences between Carey supporters who believed
"Hoffa want[ed] to bring back the old guard, the nepotism and the corruption" and Hoffa
supporters who believed he would strengthen the Teamsters).
492. For example, Hoffa's candidacy was made possible by a job with the Michigan Joint
Council of Teamsters headed by Larry Brennan. Hoffa and Larry's father, Bert Brennan, were
friends, business partners, and criminal codefendants. DAN MOLDEA, THE HOFFA WARS 80, 140
(1978).
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A. A New EO and Revised Election Rules
The consent order gave the government the option of
supervising the 1996 IBT election if the government chose to pay for
it.4 93 On February 7, 1995, the IBT and the government agreed that a
court-appointed officer would supervise the 1996 IBT election and
further agreed that "it is the intention of the Government and the IBT
that the Election Officer function in 1996 as similarly as possible to
the 1991 Election Officer."49' 4 After Holland resigned from his
position in 1993, Judge Edelstein appointed Amy Gladstein, an
attorney with experience at the NLRB and in private practice.495
Edelstein removed Gladstein when she hired her husband and law
partner as EO legal counsel, a decision that Judge Edelstein called
"egregious misconduct and deplorably flawed judgment. 4 96 Judge
Edelstein then appointed Barbara Quindel, a Minnesota labor
attorney who had served as one of Holland's regional coordinators.49 7
Election Officers Appointed to Oversee IBT Elections498
Officer'
Term
Background
Michael Holland
1989-1993
Labor Lawyer
Amy Gladstein
1993-1995
Labor Lawyer
Barbara Quindel
1995-1997
Labor Lawyer
Banetta Mansfield
1997
Labor Lawyer
Michael Cherkasky
1997-1999
Prosecutor
William Wertheimer 2000-2002
Labor Lawyer
Richard Mark
2005-2007
Prosecutor
The Quindel appointment drew some sharp criticism. One
Carey critic told the Journal of Commerce: "Her comportment in the
last election convinced old-guard Teamsters that she was opposed to
493. Consent Order, supra note 62, at 16.
494. Id. at 2.
495. See Philip Dine, Running Teamsters Election Full-Time Jobfor This U.S. Appointee, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 24, 1995, at IC.
496. See Neil A. Lewis, At the Bar; Wherein a Court-Appointed Lawyer Is Dismissed:
'FlawedJudgment' or 'a MarriagePenalty"?, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1995, at A27.
497. See Labor Lawyer from Milwaukee to Oversee '96 Teamsters Vote, J. COM., June 1,
1995, at 3B.
498. See supra notes 71, 495, 497 and accompanying text; infra notes 619, 670, 746 and
accompanying text; Richard W. Mark - Biography, Orrick, http://www.orrick.comlawyers/
Bio.asp?ID=96657 (last visited May 22, 2009).
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them.... There were the perceptions of local union officials that she
was zealous against the non-Carey slate. 499 Judge Edelstein also
appointed former federal judge and former deputy New York City
police commissioner Kenneth Conboy to serve as Election Appeals
Master, in order to fill the appellate role in election protests
previously played by the IA."'
Because EO Quindel was convinced that mail balloting had been
successful in the 1991 delegate-selection and general elections, she
requested that the court modify the consent order to provide that "all
direct rank-and-file voting at future IBT elections would be
conducted 'by mail ballot ...."50 Additionally, in order to reduce
the risk of intimidation and coercion at the delegate selection phase,
Quindel issued a rule permitting delegate nominations to be
submitted in writing directly to the EO office."'
Quindell's 1996 election rules were informed by prior court
decisions and experience gained from the 1991 election. A post1991-election Second Circuit decision permitted the EO to conduct
post-election investigations only when resolution of the protest could
499. Id.
500. FederalJudge Appoints a New Overseerfor Teamsters' Election, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
1997, at A26. Kenneth C. Crowe described Conboy as "a bulldog for detail and a skeptical crossexaminer of forgetful witnesses .... Kenneth C. Crowe, Ex-Judge to Make Decision on Carey,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 1, 1997, at A57.
501. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Consent Order Modification), 159 F.R.D. 437,
440 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Local unions would no longer be permitted to select convention delegates
via in-person balloting except in compelling circumstances. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters (1996 Election Rules Decision), 896 F. Supp. 1349, 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Ironically,
the consent order required that all balloting occur in person. Consent Order, supra note 62, at 15
("All direct rank-and-file voting by secret ballot described above shall be by in-person ballot box
voting at local unions or absentee ballot procedures where necessary ....
").EO Holland's 1991
proposed election rules provided for local unions to use mail-in ballots for delegate elections. No
parties objected to the rule and Judge Edelstein approved it without comment. HOLLAND, supra
note 78, ch. 2, at 10; see also United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (1991 Election Rules
Order), 742 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Holland believed mail balloting would produce greater
voter participation. HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 2, at 10. After the delegate elections, Holland
was impressed by the higher participation at those local unions using mail ballots. He therefore
proposed that the general election should similarly use mail ballots. The three slates of
International Union Officer candidates, the Teamsters for a Democratic Union, and the
Association for Union Democracy, did not object. Id. ch. 4, at 3. Judge Edelstein approved the
plan without addressing the direct contradiction with the consent crder. Consent Order
Modification, 159 F.R.D. at 438-40. Quindel preferred mail ballots at every stage. She requested
that Judge Edelstein modify the consent order. Id. at 440. A consent order may be modified "by
establishing that there has been a significant change in circumstances, factual or legal, and that
the proposed modification is suitably tailored to deal with the changed circumstances." Juan F. v.
Weicker, 37 F.3d 874, 878 (2d Cir. 1994).
502.

Consent Order Modification, 159 F.R.D. at 438-39.
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affect the election's outcome." 3 Leroy Ellis had alleged that his
employer, Roadway Express, terminated him for running for
international vice president on the Carey slate.5" EO Holland had
ordered that Ellis be reinstated with back pay. 5 However, Holland's
decision was nullified because it had not been rendered within five
days.50 6 After the election, Ellis refiled the protest under the more
generous post-election time limit for protests. 0 7 However, the
election rules authorized the EO to decide a post-election protest
only if the "alleged violation may have affected the outcome of the
election.""5 Because Ellis had been successfully elected to the vice
presidency, the employer's alleged violations had not affected the
election. 0 9 Judge Edelstein approved a rule change for the 1996
election that authorized the EO to investigate and resolve any postelection protest alleging retaliation.'
The 1996 election rules also sought to ensure that candidates
would have reasonable access to employers' property for campaign
purposes. 11 Following the 1991 election, the Supreme Court held in
Lechmere, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board 2 that the

National Labor Relations Act did not give non-employees a right to
campaign on an employer's premises. 3 Quindel determined that, in
the absence of an enforceable provision in the Election Rules, nonemployee union members had no right of access to an employer's
premises." 4 However, she promulgated a (rebuttable) right to
campaign in parking lots during hours when IBT members were
likely to be there. 1 5
503. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Ellis), 3 F.3d 634, 637 (2d. Cir. 1993).
504. Id. at 636-37.
505. Id. at 636.
506. Id. at 637.
507. Id. at 638.
508. Id. at 637. Judge Edelstein upheld all of the 1996 election rules in United States v. Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 943 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
509. Ellis. 3 F.3d at 637.
510. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (1996 Election Rules Decision), 896 F. Supp.
1349, 1360-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
511. Id. at 1364.
512. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
513. Id. at 538.
514. 1996 Election Rules Decision, 896 F. Supp. at 1365.
515. Id. at 1365 (The presumption could be rebutted by showing "that access to that particular
employer's employee parking lot is neither necessary nor appropriate to meaningful exercise of
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B. The 1996 Election and Post-ElectionProtest

1. The 1996 Presidential Challengers
In 1995, almost two years before the next election, Sam
Theodus, a member of Carey's 1991 slate, announced that he would
run for general president.' 16 Ten years earlier, with TDU's
endorsement, Theodus had mounted a futile challenge to incumbent
General President Jackie Presser.5 7 Theodus was elected on the
Carey slate in 1991 as International Vice President." 8 However in
1995, labeling the Carey administration "vindictive" and "morally
corrupt,' 519
Theodus called for "change, correction and
rebuilding."520
Throughout the campaign, Carey's opponents
repeatedly charged that Carey purged rivals by falsely labeling them
corrupt. 2 ' Theodus resigned from the Ethical Practices Committee,
accusing Carey's supporters on the Committee of trying to intimidate
members who attended Hoffa rallies; the EO later sustained these
charges.522 Theodus's main campaign issues were the sorry state of
IBT finances and declining Teamster membership.523 Ultimately,
however, Theodus dropped his candidacy for general president in
order to run for vice president on the Hoffa slate. 24
democratic rights ....
"). Election Officer Quindel asserted that these election rules applied to
Canadian as well as U.S. employers. Judge Edelstein agreed. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 945 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding Labatt's Brewing Co. in Toronto subject
to the election rules promulgated pursuant to the consent order.).
516. Sandra Livingston, Theodus Will Challenge Carey in Teamster Race, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, Jan. 3, 1995, at 1C.
517. CROWE, supra note 18, at 42. TDU leader Ken Paff noted, "[t]he sorry fact is Jackie
Presser could get those delegates to put the headquarters on Mars." Id. at 43.
518. Id. at 259-60.
519. Sandra Livingston, Theodus to Run on Hoffa Ticket, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 5,
1996, at 1C.
520. Sandra Livingston, Theodus Will Challenge Carey in Teamster Race, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, Jan. 3, 1995, at 1C.
521. See, e.g., Peter P. Donker, Tusino Loses First Round; Ousted Local Teamsters Boss
Pursues Claim ofRetaliation, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Apr. 16, 1996, at El. Ernest
R. Tusino, a delegate supporting Hoffa, was suspended from the union for two years by Carey. In
his complaint to the EO, Tusino accused Carey of cooking up phony charges to purge Hoffa
supporters such as himself. Id.
522. See Sandra Livingston, Ethics Haunt Union Even as Teamsters Chief Promises a New
Era, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, May 7, 1996, at 1C.
523. Sandra Livingston, 'A First-Class Hanging' Teamsters Gripe about Hearing on
Conferences, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, May 28, 1994, at 1C.
524. Sandra Livingston, Theodus May Seek Presidency,CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, May 30, 1998,
at 1C. Eventually, the Hoffa slate dropped Theodus. Id.
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James P. Hoffa Jr., had been ruled ineligible to run in 1991. In
order to become eligible, he took a job as an administrative aid to
Larry Brennan, President of IBT Joint Council 43 in Michigan and a
long-time Hoffa family friend.5 25 Hoffa announced his candidacy on
the anniversary of his legendary father's disappearance, widely
attributed to a Mafia assassination. 26 Stressing the deterioration of
the IBT's finances and membership, he promised to reverse the trend
by cutting salaries, spending, and the "tremendous amount of
perks. '5 27 "Today, I look at a union that has fallen on hard times, that
is really in financial trouble . . . that needs leadership. 528 He

proposed increasing the strike fund again, so that benefits varied
according to the amount of monthly dues paid by the member; the
maximum weekly strike benefit would be $250.529

Hoffa criticized the National Master Freight Agreement.

"Carey put an ineffective team on the field to negotiate ...

31

didn't

have a clue how to negotiate. Members have to suffer for their
ineptitude. Employers got everything they wanted-a 400 percent
increase in intermodal use, part-timers, binding arbitration.

5 31

In

addition, he attacked Carey for drawing on other unions to hire his
administration staff. "When I become president, I'll fire those
[United] [M]ine [W]orkers and I'm putting Teamsters in those
jobs. 532
Hoffa disputed Carey's record as an anti-corruption reformer.
"Whatever cleanup has happened... [Carey] hasn't done it... [t]he
government has done it."5'

33

He accused Carey of distributing

525. CROWE, supra note 18, at 168.
526. Tom Robbins, In the Name of the Father:Hoffa's Son is Goingfor the Brass Ring, The
Teamsters Presidency, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 4, 1995, at 14. See FRANK SHEEHAN &
CHARLES BRANDT, I HEARD YOU PAINT HOUSES: THE LAST RIDE OF JIMMY HOFFA (2004);
LESTER VELIE, DESPERATE BARGAIN: WHY JIMMY HOFFA HAD TO DIE (1977).
527. John O'Brien, Hoffa Son Vows Power to Union, CHI. TRIB., June 14,1996, at 4.
528. Sharon Cohen, Hoffa Bids to Lead Teamsters; Son Seeking to Follow Famous Fatheras
Chief of Union, Vows to Solve Financial Difficulties, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, CO),
Sept. 3, 1995, at 20A.
529. John D. Schulz, Teamsters Kick Off Feisty Election; Carey Claims Lead Over "Junior"
Hoffa, TRAFFIC WORLD, July 15, 1996, at 22.
530. See John D. Schulz, Hoffa Preparing '96 Challenge to Carey, TRAFFIC WORLD, Jan. 23,
1995, at 14.
531. Id.
532. Randolph Heaster, Teamsters Hear Message From Hoffa, KAN. CITY STAR, June 10,
1996, at B 1.
533. John D. Schulz, '96 Challenge, supra note 530, at 14.
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"perks,"

including allegedly, "seven secret" apartments for
Teamsters officials.5 34 Hoffa sharply rejected charges that he was
associated with or sympathetic to the mafia, saying: "I have never
associated with organized crime ... and I have said they killed my
'
father and they will never come back into the Teamsters union."535
Hoffa called ending court-supervision a top priority: "It's time
for the government to leave, thank you. The membership wants their
union back. 5 36 Hoffa stated:
I intend to sit down with the President of the United States
and tell him what we've accomplished under this consent
agreement . . . . If the government wants to continue to
monitor our elections, fine. We can live with things like
that, but we must have a timetable for when this will end...
. The idea of the federal government running an
organization like ours in a democratic society just isn't
37
right.1
Hoffa further promised to create an independent Ethical Practices
Committee.538
2. The 1996 Convention
The IBT's 1996 national convention in Philadelphia was highly
contentious. EO Quindel tried to schedule a debate, but Carey
declined, saying he was too busy.5 39 Hoffa proposed that the
Teamsters constitution be amended to compel a presidential
debate. 4 ° Arguing that this would interfere with her exclusive
authority to establish rules that govern the convention, 41 Quindel
42
obtained an injunction from Judge Edelstein.

534. O'Brien, supra note 527, at 4.
535. Sharon Cohen, James Hoffa, the Son, Makes Bid for Teamster Presidency, WICHITA
EAGLE, Sept. 10, 1995, at 7A.
536. John D. Schulz, '96 Challenge,supra note 530, at 14.
537. Mike Dooley, Hoffa Says Graft Tops Problems in Union, FORT WAYNE NEWS SENTINEL
(Ind.), May 18, 1996, at 8A.
538. John D. Schulz, supra note 529 at 8.
539. John D. Schulz, No Carey-Hoffa Debate, TRAFFIC WORLD, July 15, 1996, at 8.
540. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Hoffa Debates), 939 F. Supp. 226, 227
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
541. Id. at 228.
542. See Schulz, supra note 539, at 8; see also Hoffa Debates, 939 F. Supp. at 233.
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On the first day of the IBT Philadelphia convention, Hoffa
They booed
supporters several times halted the proceedings.
throughout U.S. Senator Arlen Specter's (R-Pa.) speech, the national
anthem, and the moment of silence for deceased members. 43 They
protested against Carey's rejection of their motion to prohibit voting
by eighty unelected, Carey-appointed super delegates." Journalists
who observed the voice vote on the issue described it as "evenly
'
matched"545
or favoring Hoffa 46 but Carey declared the motion
defeated. The fracas caused the Teamsters to call the police and
clear the hall. 47

Hoffa introduced a number of proposals, including: paying for
increased strike benefits by drawing $15 million from the union
treasury;54 8 and reinforcing the autonomy of local unions by, among
other things, restricting the authority of the IBT president to impose
trusteeships on locals deemed corrupt. 49
Carey used various

parliamentary tactics to prevent these motions from reaching a
50
vote.
Carey's convention agenda included resolutions condemning
congressional Republicans and endorsing President Bill Clinton's

reelection. 5 ' Carey allocated most of a day for a debate on changing
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters' title to a gender-neutral
name.5 52
He also repeatedly refused to close debate on a

noncontroversial oath of office for union officers. 53 According to

543. Jeffrey Brodeur, Boos Mark Teamsters Convention, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, July 16,
1996, at 8D.
544. See Peter T. Kilborn, Delegate Battle Delays Teamsters Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, July 16,
1996, at A12. Past IBT presidents had also appointed super delegates. Id.
545. Merrill Goozner, Teamsters Open With Shouting Match, CHI. TRIB., July 16, 1996, at 1.
546. Kilborn, supra note 544, at A12.
547. UproarHalts Teamsters Convention, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 16, 1996, at 5A.
548. Kenneth C. Crowe, Teamsters President Ties Rivals in Red Tape, NEWSDAY, July 18,
1996, at A51.
549. Peter T. Kilborn, Teamster Chief Outmaneuvers Foes at Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
1996, at A10.
550. Id.
551. See Daniel LeDuc, In a Display of Unity, Teamsters Decry Republicans in Congress.
They Declined to Endorse Clinton, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 18, 1996, at A8.
552. Peter T. Kilbom, Causefor Sibling Rivalry at Teamsters, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1996, at
A16. The vote failed by an almost 2-to-i margin. Peter T. Kilborn, In New Rebuff to Leader,
Teamsters Vote to Remain a Brotherhood,N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1996, at D23.
553. See Chris Isidore, Gridlock Grips Teamster Meeting, J. COM., July 18, 1996, at lB.
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well-respected labor journalist Kenneth Crowe, previously a Carey
admirer:
Carey ...has used his position as convention chairman to
frustrate Hoffa's agenda . . . . Carey has frequently ruled
opposition speakers out of order, strung out debates over
procedural points and ordered time-consuming votes.
Votes early in the week showed that Hoffa has a slight edge
in the number of delegates, but not enough to push through
his program. 54
"When it came to the nomination balloting, Carey received fewer
votes than Hoffa (775-954),555 a portentous rebuke for the incumbent
general president.
In the final months of the campaign, the candidates traded
corruption charges. At the recommendation of the Independent
Review Board ("IRB"), Carey imposed a trusteeship on Chicago
Local 714 headed by Bill Hogan, a powerful Hoffa ally and vice
presidential candidate on the Hoffa slate.

56

Days later, without an

IRB recommendation, Carey placed Akron, Ohio Local 348 under
trusteeship because its Executive Board was so polarized that it was
unable to conduct union business. 57 One day later, pursuant to an
IRB recommendation, Carey placed Philadelphia Local 107 in
trusteeship. Hoffa charged that "[Carey is] trying to steal the
election by systematically eliminating key people who have the
'
nerve and capacity to effectively oppose him."558
Hoffa's charge gained credibility when a federal district court
judge in Philadelphia, finding Carey in bad faith, issued a

554. Crowe, supra note 548.
555. Glenn Burkins, Teamsters Chief Carey Loses Straw Poll of Delegates to Rival Candidate
Hoffa, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1996, at A14. Carey proposed that candidates for international
office have to be elected officers of Teamster locals or have worked at least two years for
Teamster employers. That requirement would have disqualified Hoffa. Surprisingly, given
Hoffa's significant delegate margin, Carey's proposal lost by a slim margin 784-745. Peter
Szekely, Teamsters Leader Cuts Off Challenge: Carey Abruptly Ends Convention Dominated by
Hoffa, AKRON BEACON J., July 20, 1996, at DI.
556. Teamster Chief Takes over Chicago Local, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1996, at 12. Hogan
later resigned from the slate. John D. Schulz, Hogan Exits Hoffa Slate, TRAFFIC WORLD, Sept. 9,
1996, at 38.
557. See Janet Moore, Carey-Hoffa Race Divides Akron Local Teamsters' 1.4 Million
Members Will Vote by Mail in November, AKRON BEACON J., Aug. 13, 1996, at C6.
558. Hoffa Says Trusteeships Politically Motivated, J. COM., Aug. 16, 1996, at 4B (quoting
James P. Hoffa's statement about his opponent).
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preliminary injunction against the Local 107 trusteeship. 59 U.S.
Representative Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), the powerful chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, scheduled hearings to determine
whether, as Hoffa supporters insisted, the IRB was partial to the
Carey campaign. 6 Later a subcommittee of the House Committee
on Education and the Workforce held a similar hearing. 6'
Some observers feared that Carey's defeat would mean the end
of reform hope and the return of Mafia influence. 62 CNN aired a
documentary alleging that when Hoffa was a lawyer for the
Michigan Conference of Teamsters Welfare and Pension Fund in the
1990s, the fund misappropriated $725,000 for golf vacations and
other perks for fund officials and that Hoffa himself had accepted a
$205,000 wedding gift from organized-crime figures.563

The Hoffa

camp responded by alleging corrupt ties between Carey and Turner
Broadcasting System.56
It took five hundred EO staffers over five days to count the mail
ballots; seventy Carey and Hoffa campaign observers monitored the
count.565 The closeness of the vote required resolving the status of
challenged ballots. 566 The EO contacted approximately a thousand
employers to verify that challenged voters' dues had been paid.567
The eligible ballots were counted in four supplementary counts. 568 A

559. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 107 v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 935 F. Supp. 599, 604
(E.D. Pa. 1996). Judge Edelstein later transferred the case to his court and vacated the injunction.
See United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (In re IBT's Application to Enjoin Plaintiffs in Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters Local Union 107), 939 F. Supp. 280, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
560. See Jerry Seper, Teamster Takeover Is Rebuffed; Judge Sees No Evidence Philadelphia
Local Is Tied to Mob, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1996, at A7; see also Jerry Seper, Lawmakers
Suspect Monitor of Meddling in Union Election, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1996, at A5; Richard
Behar, The Trouble with the Teflon Teamster, FORTUNE, Oct. 27, 1997.
561. The Internal [sic] Review Bd.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations ofthe H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 105th Cong. 13 (1998).
562. See Holmes, supra note 491.
563. See John D. Schulz, "Go Back to His Country Club' [sic] Carey-Hoffa Contest
Intensifies as ChargesFly Amid Balloting, TRAFFIC WORLD, Nov. 18, 1996, at 58.
564. See id.
565. Philip Dine, After Long, Interesting Race, Teamsters Union Re-Elects President, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 20, 1996, available at 1996 WLNR 4593256.
566. 1996 InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters Election: HearingBefore the H. Education
and the Workforce Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 105th Cong. 55 (1997) (statement
of Barbara Zack Quindel, former IBT Election Officer).
567. Id.
568. Id.
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final count was undertaken at the request of the trailing Hoffa
Campaign. 69
Ultimately, Ron Carey defeated James P. Hoffa570 by fifteen
thousand votes out of 465,647 ballots counted. 7' EO Quindel
rejected as "completely without foundation"5 72 the Hoffa campaign's
charge that more than fifteen thousand ballots had disappeared.
Carey campaign spokesman Jere Nash said: "Now is the time for the
Hoffa campaign to put the force of action behind their talk of unity
and to gracefully accept their defeat as the result of a fair and
573
democratic election.
2. The Investigation of Carey Campaign
Finance Violations
After reviewing the Campaign Contribution and Expense
Reports ("CCERs"), EO Quindel opened an investigation of the
Carey campaign committee, Teamsters for a Corruption Free Union
("TCFU"). James Hoffa soon filed a post-election protest on the
same subject. 74 With Quindel's investigation proceeding, the media
reported that the Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney's
Office was conducting a grand jury investigation of illegal
contributions to the recently completed Carey campaign.
According to the story, Barbara Arnold donated $95,000 to TCFU 76
Arnold was married to Michael Ansara, who owned the Share Group,
a telemarketing firm retained by the November Group, which was
both an IBT and Carey campaign contractor. 77 The implication was
that Arnold's donation to the Carey campaign was a quid pro quo for

569. Id.
570. Dine, supra note 565.
571. John D. Schulz, Teamster Election Validated; Election Officer Discounts Hoffa Claims
Contesting Carey's Margin of Victory, TRAFFIC WORLD, Jan. 13, 1997, at 26.
572. Id.
573. See id.
574. See id.
575. Bernard J. Wolfson, Justice Eyes Carey Gift; Teamster Election $ $ Under Fire,
BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 8, 1997, at 14.
576. Decision of Kenneth Conboy to Disqualify IBT President Ron Carey, 1-2 (Nov. 17,
1997), available at http://www.spa.ucla.edu/ps/pdf[W00/PSM232/PDF/Carey.PDF [hereinafter
Conboy Decision] It was also alleged that Share Group had overcharged the union $26,000 for
phone banking. Edward Barnes, Donorgate in the Teamsters, TIME, Mar. 24, 1997, at 66.
577. Conboy Decision, supra note 576, at 1-2.
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IBT contracts. 78 Over the next several weeks, the media reported on
other suspicious campaign donations, amounting to $126,000. 7 9 The

Carey campaign announced that it was returning all these monies to
the original donors. 8 °
New news stories painted a picture of extensive campaign
finance abuse. Apparently, after Arnold sent $95,000 in donations to
the Carey campaign, the IBT sent two checks each for more than
$48,000 to Share Group, a telemarketing firm owned by Arnold's
husband. 8' In effect, the Carey campaign used $96,000 from the
IBT treasury for Carey's campaign, laundering the misappropriation
as a fee for services performed by the Share Group. 82 On June 6,
1997, FBI agents arrested Martin Davis, President of the November
Group on charges of embezzling $95,000 from the 1BT.583 Davis was
quoted in an FBI affidavit584as saying: "'The IBT knew of the plan and
wanted it done this way.
Additional charges involved money funneled into the Carey
campaign by Citizen Action, a consumer rights organization.
Allegedly, three weeks after the IBT made a $475,000 contribution
to Citizen Action, Citizen Action sent a $75,000 check to Share
Group to pay for work that the company never performed.8 This
transaction too looked like a scheme to fund the Carey campaign
with IBT funds.586 In June, Michael Ansara pled guilty to conspiracy
to commit money laundering.587 He stated to the press: "I did
something dishonest. All my life I've tried to lead a moral life. It
was wrong ... "588 Shortly thereafter, Bill Hamilton, the IBT's head
578. Id. at 2.
579. See Bernard J. Wolfson, Teamster Chief to Return $$, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 21, 1997,
at 28.
580. See id.
581. Jerry Seper, Campaign Contributionsto Teamsters Boss Probed, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 27,
1997, at A3.
582. See id.
583. Greg B. Smith, Teamster Boss Aide Faces Embezzle Case, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), June 7,
1997, at 10.
584. Id.
585. Kenneth C. Crowe, Court to Rule on Teamster Info, NEWSDAY, June 11, 1997, atA19.
586. See Kevin Galvin, Feds Probe Citizen Action's Alleged Ploy to Fund Teamster
Elections, LEDGER DISPATCH (Cal.), June 10, 1997, at A5.
587. Kevin Galvin, Probe Ties Illegal Aid to Top Teamster Liberal Consumer Group
Allegedly, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 10, 1997, at 69.
588. Diane Lewis, Fallfrom Grace: A Man of PrincipleAdmits Illegality, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 11, 1997, at Al.
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of government affairs and top lobbyist, resigned." 9 He had been
responsible for hiring Michael Ansara 9 °
Though Carey had been sworn in for a second five-year term as
general president, Quindel hesitated to certify the 1996 election
"'
results.59
Under the election rules, the EO could grant a postelection protest only where "the alleged violation may have affected
the outcome of the election.

59 2

However, Quindel turned to the

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA")5 93 to
find a legal standard and precedent for overturning a union
election. 94 The LMRDA applied different standards of review based
on whether or not the union election was supervised by the
Department of Labor. 95 Following an unsupervised election, the
DOL and the courts apply a presumption that a violation affected the
outcome. 96 Where the DOL supervises a union election, there is "a
presumption of fairness and regularity," and the secretary of labor
must find "convincing evidence that the violation may have affected
the outcome."5' 97 While the EO does not stand in the same position as
the secretary of labor, Quindel found the same rationale applicable to
the EO-supervised 1996 IBT election. 98 Therefore, she applied the
more searching standard of review to determine whether the IBT
election should be voided. 99
On August 22, 1997, more than eight months after the election,
Quindel declined to certify the election.6 °° Instead, she ordered a new
election for general president and for twenty-one other international

589. Chris Isidore, Teamsters' Hamilton Steps Down Amid Probe, J. COM., July 31, 1997, at
A15.
590. Id.
591. Philip Dine, Teamster President in Midst of Campaign Finance Scandal, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 4, 1997, at C1.
592. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Morris), 983 F. Supp. 488, 490 (S.D.N.Y.

1997).
593. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2000).
594. Morris, 983 F. Supp. at 491.
595. See id. at 491-92.
596. Id. at 491.
597. Id. at491-92.
598. Id.
599. See id.
600. Glenn R. Simpson, Union Troubles: Fundingfor Election of Teamster President is
Subject ofInquiry, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1997, at Al.
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Quindel's report alleged a contribution scheme by
offices.6"'
consultants and Carey campaign officials whereby money was
embezzled from the IBT, laundered through Carey-friendly
organizations, and returned to the Carey campaign.6 "2 She did not
disqualify General President Carey from the rerun election because
she did not find that Carey himself knew about the illegal campaign
contributions.6 "3
Quindel's report explained how Michael Ansara had approached
a volunteer fundraiser for Citizen Action; pitched the importance of
Carey's reelection to the labor movement; and suggested that, in
exchange for campaign contributions for Carey's reelection, the IBT
would make a large contribution to an organization designated by the
contributor.6 4 In fact, the IBT's $475,000 donation to Citizen Action
was followed by contributions to the Carey campaign.6 5 In addition,
on the same day Carey approved the donation to Citizen Action, he
approved contributions of $260,000 to three other organizations.6 6
By end of August, Quindel was under fire from all sides.
Hoffa's supporters criticized her for ignoring Carey campaign
finance violations and for persistent pro-Carey bias.60 7 Carey's
supporters attacked her decision to order a rerun election and for
ignoring Hoffa campaign finance violations.6 8 Carey was partially
vindicated when the Election Appeals Master, Kenneth Conboy,
ordered Quindel to "thoroughly and convincingly" investigate the

601. Feds Order New Teamsters Election, CNN, Aug. 22, 1997, http://www.cnn.com/
ALLPOLITICS/1997/08/22/teamsters/.
602. Id.
603. Conboy Decision, supra note 576, at 5. Hoffa supporters criticized the timing of
Quindel's disqualification because it followed the successful IBT strike against the UPS, the
IBT's largest employer; arguably the strike enhanced Carey's stature in the Union. Quindel
admitted that she was ready to release her report and nullify the election eighteen days earlier but
delayed its release until the resolution of the historic strike. See Federal Official Orders
Teamsters To Restage Election: Fund-Raising Abuses Cited in PresidentialCampaign; Carey
Not Accused of Wrongdoing, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 23, 1997 at D.
604. Bill Sammon, How Union Treasury Funded Carey; Creative Plan Laundered Money to
Win Teamsters Election, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1997, at Al.
605. Id.
606. Id. He later claimed not to remember approving these donations. Id.
607. Stephen Labaton, Teamsters Election Monitor Is Reported Planning to Quit, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1997, at §1, at 8.
608. Id.
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protest against the Hoffa campaign." 9 In early September 1997, she
resigned, citing family reasons.6"'
Meanwhile, Republicans in
Congress called for hearings on the propriety of using government
funds to run and rerun IBT elections.6"
Federal investigators next focused on allegations that Martin
Davis had concocted a scheme whereby the Teamsters would give $1
million to the Democratic National Committee in exchange for
wealthy Democratic donors making contributions to Carey's
campaign.612 Nash, Ansara, and Davis-all of whom were now
cooperating with federal authorities-implicated the AFL-CIO in a
scheme to funnel $150,000 to Citizen Action.613 They alleged that
the Democratic National Committee tried to arrange a donation of
$100,000 to the Carey campaign by a foreign citizen who wanted to
contribute to the Clinton campaign; in exchange for the contribution
to the Carey campaign, the IBT would donate hundreds of thousands
of dollars to the Democratic Party.6 4 Ultimately, the Teamsters
rejected the proposed donation because the foreign citizen was an
employer.615
Quindel left her EO position in late September after an apparent
conflict of interest came to light.6 6 Martin Davis alleged that he had
proposed a contribution swap with the Wisconsin chapter of the New
Party, a political organization in which both Quindel and her

609. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Carey Slate Protest), 9 F. Supp. 2d 354, 356
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd, 168 F.3d 645 (2d Cir. 1999).
610. Kenneth C. Crowe, Aide Quits After Voiding Carey Election, NEWSDAY, Sept. 5, 1997,
at A73.
611. Overseeing Vote by Teamsters Called a Waste, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 31,
1997, at A10.
612. Steven Greenhouse, 3 Teamster Aides Make Guilty Pleas and Hint at Plot, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 1997, at Al.
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. Id.
616. See Kevin Galvin, Loads of Turmoil Union Election Overseer Quits, WICHITA EAGLE,
Sept. 24, 1997, at A17. Criticism continued even after her resignation. Congressional
Republicans called on her to justify her $1 million salary. Bill Sammon, U.S. Overseerfor
Teamsters Election Was Paid $1 Million; House Subcommittee to Ask Quindel to Justify
Expenses, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1997, at Al. In connection with this investigation, federal
investigators interviewed Harold Ickes, the former White House deputy chief of staff and Terence
McAuliffe, the Clinton campaign's finance chairman. Steven Greenhouse & Don Van Natta, Jr.,
ProposedDeal with DemocratsDraws Focus of Investigators in Teamsters Election, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 1997, at A26.

Winter 2009]

COMBATING ORGANIZED CRIME

husband were active members.617 In addition, Davis had successfully
solicited an illegal $20,000 contribution from a labor relations
consultant with close ties to a member of the EO office.618 Judge
Edelstein appointed labor lawyer Benetta Mansfield as Quindel's
interim successor6 1 9 and assigned Election Appeals Master Conboy
responsibility to determine whether Ron Carey should be disqualified
from the rerun election.62 °
On November 17, 1997, Conboy disqualified Carey from the
rerun election, basing his decision largely on Quindel's report and on
evidence provided by Ansara, Nash, and Davis.621 Conboy stated
that "IBT funds ... were used as leverage in an attempt to obtain
funds for the Carey campaign .... ,62' Davis had used both Citizen
Action and the AFL-CIO to funnel money back to the Carey
campaign. 621 Conboy concluded that after donating $475,000 to
Citizen Action, Davis attempted to send an additional $150,000 to
Citizen Action, but IBT Government Affairs Director Bill Hamilton
turned down the request for the donation given the large amount
already donated.624 Only momentarily stymied, Davis then persuaded
the AFL-CIO's secretary-treasurer to accept $150,000 and make a
donation of equal amount to Citizen Action.625
Based on testimony by Jere Nash and Monie Simpkins, Conboy
concluded that Carey had to have played a role in these contribution
swaps.626 Jere Nash told investigators that Carey had approved
several swaps. 627 According to Nash, he asked Carey to call
Democratic National Committee chairman Terry McAuliffe to thank
him for his fundraising help, and Carey later informed Nash that he
had done So. 62' Nash alleged that he had specifically discussed with
617. Id.
618. Id.
619. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Rerun Election Plan), 981 F. Supp. 222, 232
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
620. Id.
621. Conboy Decision, supra note 576, at 5.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 8-10.
Id. at 8.
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Carey the campaign financing assistance of Rich Trumka, the
Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO, and Andrew Stem, the
President of the Service Employees International Union.19 Further,
according to Nash, when Carey initially rejected his request to
donate $475,000 to Citizen Action, he told Carey that: "the proposed
contribution would help Martin Davis with fundraising. . . . Mr.
Nash stated that Mr. Carey then approved the contribution. 6 3 °
Carey's Executive Assistant Monie Simpkins6 31 said that she had
informed Carey of several Nash swap proposals and that when Carey
orally approved them, she signed Carey's initials to documents
indicating his approval.632 Conboy concluded that even if each
instance might have a plausibly innocent explanation, it was highly
unlikely that Carey was innocent of wrongdoing in all these
incidents.633 Moreover, Conboy did not find credible Carey's
testimony that he had no recollection of authorizing any of the four
largest political contributions.
Conboy was clearly troubled by the prospect of "disqualifying a
previously victorious candidate, to the evident impoverishment of the
democratic process. ' 634 However, he concluded that because Carey
had "tolerated and engaged in extensive Rules violations in broad
'
furtherance of his reelection campaign,"6 35
the upcoming election
in it. 636
participating
Carey
with
free
and
could not be full, fair,
On November 25, 1997, Carey took a leave of absence that
would ultimately become permanent.6 37
His appeals to Judge

629. Id. at 8-9.
630. Id. at 10.
631. Id. at 12-13.
632. Id. at 12.
633. Id. at 13.
634. Id. at 32.
635. Id. at 34.
636. Conboy was forced into the "paradoxical role" of "[developing] unfettered union
democracy on the one hand, and protecting the resources and institutions of rank and file
members from the corrupt abuses of its leadership on the other." Id. at 32. The only prior time a
Teamster had been disqualified from standing for election was in the Local 63 case. See
HOLLAND, supra note 78, ch. 6, at 26-28. Holland disqualified members from serving as
delegates to the national convention, and not from seeking an international union office; charges
involved "solicitation, collection and marking of ballots; repeated disregard for the directives of
the Election Officer; and interference with the Election Officer's investigation processes."
Conboy Decision, supra note 576, at 29.
637. Jim Lynch, Amid Teamsters Fray,PortlanderWaits, OREGONIAN, Nov. 27, 1997, at Cl.
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Edelstein and then to the Second Circuit were unsuccessful.638 Both
courts rejected Carey's due process complaint because Conboy was
not a state actor.639 The courts also rejected Carey's argument that he
had been denied due process under the LMRDA because the election
disqualification was neither punitive nor disciplinary in nature, but
remedial in furtherance of the consent order's mandate for fair IBT
elections.64° After both courts upheld Carey's disqualification from
the rerun election, the Independent Review Board permanently
barred Ron Carey and Bill Hamilton from IBT membership for
life.64 ' Tom Sever, who had served as secretary-treasurer under Ron
Carey, took over as interim general president." 2
In 2001, a federal grand jury indicted Carey on charges that he
committed perjury in sworn testimony before the EO and the IRB, as
well as before a grand jury." 3 At trial, Carey was acquitted of all
charges, 6" but his lifetime ban from IBT membership was not
overturned.645
A week after being disqualified from the rerun election, Carey
appeared at TDU's annual convention. TDU had voted unanimously
to stand by him during his appeal.646 For TDU, Carey represented the
best hope for progressive IBT reform. In response to TDU members'
statements of support, Carey said, "Some of that sounded like an
638. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Carey Disqualification), 988 F. Supp. 759, 770
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 156 F.3d 354 (2d Cir. 1998). The IRB subsequently permanently barred
Carey from the union. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Carey & Hamilton Discipline),
22 F. Supp. 2d 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd, 247 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2001).
639. Carey Disqualification, 988 F. Supp. at 763. Carey alleged lack of due process because
he did not have the opportunity to be present to confront and cross-examine witnesses and that his
case was "based on evidence taken in secret." Carey Disqualification, 156 F.3d at 364 (quoting
Carey).
640. Carey Disqualification, 988 F. Supp. at 765 (explaining that the EO's role is not to
discipline, but rather to supervise and resolve disputes regarding the election).
641. Carey & Hamilton Discipline,22 F. Supp. 2d at 139. Carey's final request to the district
court was that "[a]t a bare minimum, the Court should make clear that Mr. Carey's son, also a
member of the IBT, would not be subject to discipline for associating with his father." Id. at 145
n.5. Judge Edelstein so held. Id. at 145.
642. John D. Schulz, Hoffa on Hold, TRAFFIC WORLD, Jan. 18, 1999, at 22.
643. Ex-Teamster Chief Carey Indicted in Funds Probe, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 26, 2001, at 3; see
Robert Gearty, Ex-Teamsters Boss Goes on Trial, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 27, 2001, at 17.
644. Nancy Cleeland, Ex-Teamster Leader Carey Acquitted, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, at
A18.
645. Id.
646. See John Russell, Ron Carey Vows to Fight to the End, AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 23,
1997, at B1.
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epitaph. This guy ain't gone," sparking a forty-second ovation. 7
Carey assured the group that he had never known about the illegal
activities of his campaign staff: "If I had known that anything was
improper, I would have stopped it dead in its tracks.... What went
on hurt our union and hurt a lot of innocent people."" t "I want to
look around this room and look in everyone's eyes and to tell you
that that decision was dead wrong.""
Some reformers who had equated Carey's success with
Teamsters reform were clearly worried by the turn of events.65
Speaking to the Associated Press, former EO Michael Holland
credited Carey with turning the IBT around:
The genie of a more responsive union working assiduously
for its members will never be put back in the bottle....
Whether the person that they choose symbolizes [the
rank-and-file] as much as Ron Carey seemed to symbolize
them is really not so much the point as it is the members
having the opportunity to express their will on a continuing
basis.65'
652
C. The 1998 Rerun Election and the Rise ofJames P. Hoffa

EO Quindel had begun planning for the 1998 election in August
1997 after having refused to certify the 1996 election.653 She
proposed an expeditious rerun election that would cost less than the
$17.5 million 1996 election.654 The 1998 rules provided that
previously nominated candidates need not seek renomination but that
supplemental nominations would be permitted. 655 There would not
647. Steven Greenhouse, Teamster Camp Hails Fallen Carey Even as It Scans Room for a
Successor,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1997, at A14.
648. Russell, supra note 646, at B 1.
649. Greenhouse, supra note 647, at A14.
650. See Kevin Galvin, Carey's Downfall Seen as a Blow to Labor Reform, LEDGER
DISPATCH (Cal.), Nov. 25, 1997, at A14.
651. Id.
652. See Ellen Simon, Teamster Vote Date Is Hardly a Lock: Who 'll
Pay the Tab Come Sept.
14?, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Aug. 20, 1998, at 1.
653. See United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (In re Application X of the Election
Officer), 981 F. Supp. 222, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
654. 1996 InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters Election: HearingBefore the H. Education
and the Workforce Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 105th Cong. 55 (1997) (statement
of Barbara Zack Quindel, former IBT Election Officer).
655. See id. at 227.
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be a national convention.6"6 The rules prohibited candidates from
switching slates, which would have been tantamount to "restart[ing]
'
Finally the rules set a limit on
the entire election process."657
campaign contributions, allowing candidates to donate $5,000 to
their own campaign and members to donate a maximum $1,000 to
any one candidate.1 8 The government and the Carey slate (Carey
would not be disqualified until two months later) supported the
plan.659 The Hoffa slate objected to Quindel's proposals. Judge
Edelstein ruled in favor of Quindel on every point.66 °
By the time Judge Edelstein approved the rerun election plan,
Quindel had resigned,66 ' and the U.S. Senate had added to an
appropriations bill the requirement that the IBT reimburse the
government for expenses incurred in the 1998 rerun election.662
Congress later added to the fiscal 1998 appropriations bill an explicit
prohibition on using federal funds for the IBT's rerun election.663
Funds for the rerun election had to come from somewhere. The
IBT claimed that the government, having elected to supervise the
1996 election at its own expense, should pay for the rerun election as
well.66 Without taking a position as to who should be the funder,
interim EO Mansfield asked Judge Edelstein to resolve the issue.665
Judge Edelstein held that: "The time has come when the IBT must
bear its own costs for cleansing its Augean stable. In plainer words

656.
657.
658.
659.
660.

See id.
See id. at 228.
See id. at 229.
See id. at 226.
See id. at 232.

661. See Chris Isidore, Resignation Could Delay Rerun of Teamster Vote, J. COM., Sept. 25,
1997, at 16A.
662. See David Hosansky, Tackling Teamsters Ties, J. COM., Sept. 18, 1997, at 6A.
663. The EO budgeted $21.2 million for the 1996 election and spent $17.5 million by the end
of September. However, the two congressional appropriations subcommittees with oversight of
the DOJ placed legislative holds on transferring the remaining appropriated money to the EO.
United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Rerun FundingI), 989 F. Supp. 468, 471-72 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), rev'd, 141 F.3d 405 (2d Cir. 1998). The government funding of the election may have
been something of a windfall for the Teamsters. Because of the broad definition of the term
"supervise," the government paid many routine Teamster election expenses, i.e., for printing,
mailing, and counting ballots. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Rerun Funding I), 141
F.3d 405, 407 (2d Cir. 1998).
664. Rerun FundingI, 989 F. Supp. at 474..
665. Rerun FundingII, 141 F.3d at 408.
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they made the mess. It is their job to clean it up at any price. ' A
divided Second Circuit panel reversed.667 The majority did not agree

that the IBT was responsible for causing the rerun. Characterizing
the IBT as a victim of Carey's and Hamilton's embezzlement, the
judges concluded that the IBT could not be held vicariously liable668
and that the government must bear the cost of the rerun election.669
1. The Rerun Election
In November 21, 1997, Judge Edelstein appointed former

prosecutor Michael Cherkasky670 as EO for the rerun election and
acceded to Cherkasky's request that the election be postponed until
he had an opportunity to investigate the Carey slate's campaign
protest regarding the Hoffa slate's campaign finance irregularities.6 71
In late February 1998, EO Cherkasky proposed that the rerun
election take place that summer.6 72 Judge Edelstein did not agree,
noting that a decision on the rerun election should wait until
Cherkasky had concluded the investigation.67 3 However, Judge
Edelstein did support Cherkasky's proposal that candidates be
permitted to switch slate affiliation6 74 in light of Carey's

disqualification.

666. Rerun Funding 1, 989 F. Supp. at 478. Judge Edelstein also ruled that the government
should contribute $920,000 held in an escrow account towards the cost of the rerun election. The
account received restitution payments from three individual defendants-Jere Nash, Martin
Davis, and Michael Ansara-who pled guilty and an additional $500,000 from the settlement of
charges against the November Group. See id. at 477-78.
667. Rerun Funding11, 141 F.3d at 409.
668. Id.
669. See id. Of course, such a ruling did not guarantee that Congress would appropriate the
money to "supervise" the election.
670. Michael Cherkasky formerly served as a high-level assistant in the Manhattan district
attorney's office. He served as a court-appointed monitor for the cleanup of the New Jersey
carting industry; that job earned him the title of "garbage czar." See Tina Daunt, N.Y Mob
Prosecutorto Take on the LAPD Police, L.A. TIMEs, July 24, 2001, at 1.
671. Quindel had declined to act on Carey's protest. Conboy ordered her to conduct a full
investigation. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Carey Slate Protest), 9 F. Supp. 2d 354,
356 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
672. Teamsters Might Vote in Summer, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 1998, at 4. The ballots would
have been mailed to the membership on July 27 and returned by August 25. Election Overseer
Draws Teamsters Plan, AKRON BEACON J., Feb. 25, 1998, at C12.
673. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Rerun Election Plan I1), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3896, at *4--5 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
674. See id. at *7-8.
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At the end of April 1998, EO Cherkasky resolved the protest
675 He found
regarding the Hoffa campaign's financial irregularities.
First, two employers
several campaign-finance violations.
improperly contributed over $167,000 by grossly underbilling for
work conducted for the Hoffa campaign.6 76 Second, the campaign
failed to disclose $44,000 of cash contributions, including a $1,000
contribution from former IBT General President William
McCarthy. 677 Third, international vice presidential candidate Tom
O'Donnell's campaign had failed to disclose hiring a convicted
felon.678

Despite these campaign violations, Cherkasky concluded that
Hoffa should not be disqualified from the 1998 rerun election
because his campaign's violations lacked the "hallmarks" that had
required Carey's disqualification-personal knowledge, intentional
misconduct, and abuse of official authority.679 Instead, Cherkasky
fined the Hoffa slate 10 percent of the improper contributions
received from employers and barred those employers from
campaigning for or contracting with a campaign or independent
committee during the rerun election.68 ° Judge Edelstein noted that
Hoffa's violations, including his intentional concealment of the
McCarthy contribution and the employment of a convicted felon,
were "worrisome and suspect" and represented a "deliberate attempt
However, he agreed that
to mislead the IBT members."68'
Cherkasky's "primary role is not to punish election misconduct, but
6 2
to protect the election process from the effect of misconduct.""
Nevertheless, he increased the Hoffa slate's fine to $167,000, the full
amount of the illegal employer contribution.6 83

675. See Carey Slate Protest, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 356.
676. Id. at 357.
677. Id.
678. Employing a felon is not a violation of the rules, but the campaign concealed his
employment by issuing paychecks to the real payee's wife. Id.
679.
680.
681.
682.

Id.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 360.
Id.

683. Id. at 363. The Second Circuit affirmed the decision not to disqualify Hoffa. United
States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Carey Slate Protest 1), 159 F.3d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1998). In
another decision, the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Edelstein's increase of the Hoffa campaign's
fine. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Carey Slate Protest I), 168 F.3d 645, 648 (2d Cir.
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The new timetable called for supplemental nomination ballots to
be mailed out on June 15,684 returned one month later,685 and for the

rank-and-file mail-in balloting to take place between September 14
and October 14, 1998.686 Cherkasky was able to cover the expense of
the supplemental nomination procedure by using the approximately
$1 million restitution previously paid by the three Carey campaign
defendants and the November Group.687 But Cherkasky had no
source of funds to pay for printing and mailing 1.4 million ballots,
renting office space for counting the ballots, and compensating five
hundred temporary employees.688 Three months after the Second
Circuit had ordered the government to fund the rerun election,
Congress had not yet appropriated the approximately $8.6 million
Cherkasky estimated as needed to supervise the rerun election. 6 9 By
the end of June, Cherkasky had $750,000 remaining; enough to
continue basic operations for fourteen weeks but not enough to hire
the staff and outside contractors necessary to run the election. 69' He

asked Judge Edelstein to order either the government or the IBT to
pay. "It would be astounding, and a stunning waste of decades of
effort spent fighting organized crime and labor racketeering, if the
current paralysis over funding resulted in the abandonment of this
law enforcement effort and left the rerun election in limbo ....69

1999). The fine would be used to help finance the rerun election. Kenneth C. Crowe, Hoffa
Fined To Help Fund Election, NEWSDAY, June 24, 1998, at A5 1.
684. Judge OKs Teamsters Vote Schedule But Finding Way To Fund Election Could Stall
Balloting, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 6, 1998, at 4; Teamsters Election Faces Delay Over
FundingImpasse, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 12, 1998, at 2C.
685. See sources cited in note 684..
686. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Rerun Election Plan I11), 22 F. Supp. 2d 131,
132 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
687. Crowe, supra note 683.
688. Id.
689. Id.
690. Teamster Monitor Seeking Funds,CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 26, 1998, at 3C.
691. Id. (quoting Cherkasky). U.S. Representative Peter Hoekstra (R-Mich.), who chaired the
important Oversight Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce,
conducted extensive hearings on the election and vigorously opposed saddling taxpayers with the
costs. Crowe, supra note 683. He stated: "I don't see any way in which this Congress can, or
should, ask the American people, the taxpayers, to bail out this union's leadership again." John
D. Schulz, Hoffa Gets Closer; Judge Clears Hoffa 's Bid for Teamsters' Presidency, TRAFFIC
WORLD, June 29, 1998, at 15 (quoting Rep. Pete Hoekstra).
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The convention delegates mailed in 982 nominating ballots.692
Both Tom Leedham, the head of the union's warehouse division and
the endorsed candidate of TDU, and John Metz, the head of the
public employee division, obtained the necessary 5 percent to be
placed on the general election ballot.693 Hoffa's place on the ballot
was guaranteed by dint of his nomination at the 1996 convention.694
In early August 1998, U.S. Representative Peter Hoekstra (RMich.), Chair of the Oversight Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Education and the Workforce, announced a
compromise that would provide the funds necessary to conduct the
rerun election. 695 The government could give the IBT $4 million to

conduct the election, but the money would have to come from asset
forfeitures and unexpended fund balances.696 In other words,
speaking literally, the government would not use "taxpayer
' The money would be paid to the IBT as "reimbursement"
money."697
for expenses related to the cost of supporting the Independent
Review Board rather than as support for an election. 69 8 Then the IBT

would give the money to the EO to cover the cost of the 1998
election.699 This formalistic maneuver allowed Hoekstra to save face
since he had so vigorously opposed using taxpayer money to pay for
a private union election.7"'
Under the terms of the agreement, the IBT would contribute
between $2 million and $3 million for the election." However, at
the last minute it refused to do so. An infuriated 88-year-old Judge
692. Sandra Livingston, Teamsters Race Now Has Three Candidates;Hoffa Still Deemed the
Frontrunner,CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, July 1, 1998, at IC. Applying the same 5-percent-delegate
requirement for getting on the general election ballot as was required at the previous two
nominating conventions, candidates needed just fifty votes to be nominated. Id.
693. Id.
694. Id.
695. Phillip Dine, GOP Offers to Help Fund, Oversee Teamsters Vote, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Aug. 5, 1998, at Al1.

696. Id.
697. Id.
698. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Rerun Election Plan II1), 22 F. Supp. 2d 131,
133 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
699. Id.
700. The IRB, which investigates violations of the consent order and the IBT Constitution, is
paid for by the union. See generally id. (discussing the budget provided to the EO for supervising
the Union elections); see also Jacobs & Portnoi, supra note 19, at 445-46; Dine, supra note 695,
at Al1.
701. Simon, supra note 652.
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Edelstein said that if there were a way to hold everyone involved in
contempt of court, he would. "What can we do to save this election
from becoming a Greek tragedy?""0 2 He ordered the GEB to vote up
or down on funding the election by September 4th.7"3 "Of all my
experience, I must say this is the most revolting, because nobody
here seems interested in the ultimate result: that an election be held
that is fair, free and honest." "
On August 30, 1998, the IBT's General Eexecutive Board voted
to spend $2 million on the rerun of its 1996 election.0 This gave
EO Cherkasky $6 million with which to conduct the rerun election;
he had budgeted for $8.6 million.0 6 Cherkasky pared down his
budget by slicing money from investigations and security.7 7
2. The 1998 Rerun Election:
The Candidates and the Campaign
As the first months of 1998 passed with uncertainty regarding
the timing of the rerun election, there were reasons for TDU to be
pleased. Reform candidates had been elected in Hoffa strongholds,
such as Dallas, Columbus, Chicago Local 705, and even in Detroit
Local 299, Hoffa's father's local.708
In April 1998, Ken Hall, head of the union's 220,000 member
Small-Package Division, announced his candidacy for the
presidency. 9 In 1997, Hall had played a key role in the historic and
successful strike against UPS, a role that had placed him close to

702. Id.
703. Id.
704. Id.
705. Ellen Simon, Teamsters Ante Up for Vote, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 1, 1998,
at 19.
706. Id. The 1996 election had cost more than $17 million. Make Union Foot the Bill, USA
TODAY, Oct. 20, 1997, at 20A.
707. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Rerun Election Plan III), 22 F. Supp. 2d 131,
133-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Specifically, Cherkasky would "not be able to engage field staff
routinely to conduct in-person investigations" but would instead enforce the requirement that
"any protestor ... present evidence that a violation has occurred, in order to dispose summarily of
certain protests." Id. at 133.
708. Diane E. Lewis, Teamsters Reformer Looks Ahead Focus Is on Finding Hoffa
Challenger,BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 1998, at E3.
709. Teamsters' Strike Leader to Oppose Hoffa, Union Members Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,
1998, at A25.
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Carey. 1 ° Hall quickly received Carey's endorsement7 1' and within a
week TDU's. 7 12 TDU organizer Ken Paff described Hall as "the
'
person who can unify the [IBT] and pull people together."7 13
Unfortunately, a serious eye condition forced Hall to withdraw from
the race six weeks later."'
Three new candidates joined the race for general president.
Tom Leedham, head of the Teamsters' 250,000-member Warehouse
Division, stepped in as the TDU-backed candidate.715 Sam Theodus,
who had in 1996 defected from Carey to Hoffa, now withdrew from
the Hoffa slate to run for president in his own right.7 16 John Metz,
President of Joint Council 13 in St. Louis, who had served in Carey's
administration as head of the Public Employees Division, also threw
his hat into the ring.717 Theodus failed to receive the necessary
delegate-nominating votes to win a place on the ballot, so the
election proceeded with Hoffa, Leedham, and Metz.7"'
Leedham, enthusiastically backed by TDU,719 defined himself as
a reformer who would carry on the Carey legacy. 2 1 "We want to
carry through with the reforms, but we think reform has to come a lot
faster and go a lot further. 7 2 ' He said of Carey, "Nobody's done

710. Kenneth C. Crowe, Carey Backing Hall to Head Teamsters, NEWSDAY, Apr. 6, 1998, at
A22. He stated: "We demonstrated to our members and corporate America what real power this
union has if we can put aside politics and all work together." Id.
711. Id.
712. Steven Greenhouse, Teamsters Group Backs Reform Candidatefor Union's President,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1998, at A23.
713. Stephen Franklin, Pull of the Past Leads Teamster into Campaign, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16,
1998, at 1.
714. Steven Greenhouse, New CandidateJoins Race to Lead Teamsters Union, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 1998, at A8.
715. Id. Leedham stated: "They [Hoffa slate] have a ton of money ....We don't. So we're
going to be running a grass-roots campaign. We're going to be out there with the members." Id.
716. Sandra Livingston, Theodus May Seek Presidency,CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, May 30, 1998,
at IC.
717. Philip Dine, St. Louisan Looks to Pull Upset in Teamsters' Vote, ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, June 21, 1998, at B 1.
718. Sandra Livingston, Teamsters Race Now Has Three Candidates, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER,
July 1, 1998, at IC.
719. Sandra Livingston, Teamster Reformers Back Leedham, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 2,
1998, at 2C. Leedham defended Carey, saying that he had been duped by campaign consultants.
Gail Kinsey Hill, Tom Leedham 's Unlikely Journey, OREGONIAN, July 26, 1998, at B 1.
720. Philip Dine, Third Man in Teamsters Stresses His Credentials, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, July 19, 1998, at B4.
721. Id.
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more to change this union and reform this union than Ron Carey....
He was a great reformer. He rooted out the mob from our union."722
Hoffa also defined himself as a reformer and anti-corruption
candidate.7 23 "Ron Carey is a crook. 7 24 "[Leedham] has failed to
denounce Carey, so [he] has no credibility with the members. '"725 "It

is appalling that a 'reform' group [TDU] would embarrass our union
by allowing a proven embezzler and soon-to-be-removed officer
'
[Carey] to address its convention."726
Hoffa promised to create an
independent ethics committee with "FBI-caliber credentials. 727
Invoking his father's legacy, Hoffa promised to return the union
to its glory days. "He [Jimmy Hoffa] climbed that mountain and
made us two million strong ....

We were kings. By God, help me

72

climb that mountain again.
"We're talking about restoring the
pride; we're talking about restoring the power ....
We're playing to
7
9
the fact that we're going to be a tough union.
Having gone to
court in 1996 to force a presidential debate, Hoffa now declined to
participate in a debate organized by EO Cherkasky.73° Ultimately,
Hoffa spent $6 million on his campaign, while Leedham spent
$250,000."'
Metz tried to link Hoffa to the IBT's labor-racketeering legacy.
He used his promotional space in the Teamster to depict Hoffa on a

722.
Co1.
723.
724.
725.

Jim Lynch, Amid Teamsters Fray, Portlander Waits, OREGONIAN, Nov. 27, 1997, at

Heaster, supra note 532, at 19.
Ellen Simon, Campaignfor Change, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 28, 1998, at 19.
Jim Hill, Hoffa Campaignsin Oregon, OREGONIAN, Aug. 1, 1998, at EO1.
726. Steven Greenhouse, Teamster Group Debates Whether to Continue Backing Carey, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 1997, at 22.
727. Simon, supranote 724, at 19.
728. Randolph Heaster, Teamsters Candidates Bring Their Campaigns to KC, KAN. CITY
STAR, Aug. 18, 1998, at D13
729. Jerome R. Stockfisch, Hoffa Offers Ailing Union Tough Talk, TAMPA TRIB., July 27,
1998, at 10.
730. Hoffa Refuses Teamsters Debate, VERO BEACH PRESS J. (Fla.), Oct. 7, 1998, at Dl.
731. John D. Schulz, Hoffa-Leedham Rematch, TRAFFIC WORLD, June 12, 2000, at 21. Hoffa
again attacked the Carey regime for fiscal irresponsibility. By the end of 1997, the Teamsters'
treasury had fallen to $3.5 million, largely because of the creation of a special fund for organizing
non-union companies and on account of the benefits paid to the striking UPS workers. John D.
Schultz, Tapping Out, TRAFFIC WORLD, Aug. 24, 1998, at 16. Hoffa-supporter and President of
Local 375 in Buffalo Brian Masterson said, "They [members of the Carey administration] spent
more than Jackie Presser, and that's saying something." Fred 0. Williams, Local Teamsters Join
Hoffa Bandwagon, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 31, 1998, at 1C.
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"wanted" poster, the apparent subject of an FBI manhunt.732 He
accused Hoffa of associating with the mob, impersonating a union
official, and having corrupt cronies.733 The ad drew condemnation
from two members of Metz's own slate. 34 Metz's claim to be an
integrity candidate was undermined by revelations about Tom Sever,
a vice presidential candidate on his slate. Sever had twice run with
Carey and was currently serving as the IBT's acting president. 35 In
August, EO Cherkasky found that Sever had committed "very
serious" election-rules violations by retaliating against officers who
had endorsed other candidates and especially for retaliating against
Tom Leedham, whose negotiating authority he terminated in the
midst of ongoing negotiations with a large supermarket chain.736
Sever was not disqualified, but he was required to acknowledge his
wrongdoing in a letter to all Teamsters employees.737
When the votes were counted, James P. Hoffa won with 55
percent of the vote over Leedham's 39 percent and Metz's 6 percent.
About 34 percent of the membership voted. 38 The IBT finally
agreed to a mandatory debate rule for the general president
candidates; however, an incumbent candidate could send an IBT vice
president as a stand in.739
Hoffa took office promising to combat corruption and organized
crime. "The mob killed my father. They're never going to come
,"4' He vowed to avoid the type of
back to this union ....
partisanship that led the Carey campaign to ally with the Democratic
National Committee: "We're going to take a bipartisan approach....
We're going to support those who support what we believe is an
agenda for working men and women in this country. 7 4' He also
732. Philip Dine, Attack Dogs May Chew on Hoffa's Lead, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug.
7, 1998, at C2.
733. See id.
734. See id.
735. Kevin Galvin, Teamster Chief Told to End Retaliation, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),
Aug. 17, 1998, at 4.
736. Id.
737. Acting Teamsters ChiefSanctioned,DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 18, 1998, at 14D.
738. Hoffa Vows Revival, CINCINNATI-KY. POST, Dec. 8, 1998, at C6.
739. See id.
740. Janet L. Fix, Hoffa Vows No Ties to Mobfor Union, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 7, 1998, at
A06.
741. Id.
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reiterated his goal of ending the court supervision that had begun
42
with the 1989 consent order.

E. The 2001 and 2006 Elections
In February of 2000, the government and the IBT jointly
submitted to the court an agreement for 2000-2001 election rules
that would be subject to an election supervisor, rather than to the
DOL, as the 1989 consent order had envisioned.7 43 The rules were

modeled on the 1995-1996 election. 44 This time around, the IBT
would fund the $10 million election supervision.145 The courtappointed William Wertheimer, a Michigan labor lawyer, as the
election "administrator;" Kenneth Conboy continued as the election
7 46
appeals master.
In June 2000, Leedham announced that he would challenge
Hoffa in the 2001 election,747 once again with TDU's endorsement.748
Shortly after Leedham's announcement, Hoffa announced that IBT
membership had topped 1.5 million.7 49 Moreover, under Hoffa's
leadership the union had negotiated a car-haul agreement ratified by
80 percent of employees and a contract with Northwest Airlines
flight attendants ratified by 68 percent; challenged UPS to meet the
terms of its contract and won 6,000 new jobs in arbitration;
continued to keep the border closed to Mexican trucks despite the
North American Free Trade Agreement; and negotiated resolution to
a grocery workers strike that included $3.5 million in back pay. 5°
The union had cut costs, including $2 million in overhead and a
742. See Janet L. Fix, Hoffa Says He Can Handle Array of Teamsters' Problems, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Dec. 8, 1998, at A08.
743. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Election Access Decision), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16213, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2000). Judge Edelstein's approval of this plan was one
of his last judicial acts. He died in August 2000 at the age of ninety, after forty-eight years on the
bench. David N. Herszenhom, David N. Edelstein, 90, Judge in Federal Court for 48 Years,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2000, at B7.
744. Election Access Decision, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16213, at *2-3.
745. John D. Schulz, Hoffa-Leedham Rematch, TRAFFIC WORLD, June 12, 2000, at 21.
746. See John D. Schulz, Hoffa Odds-On Favorite; Son of Legendary Labor Leader Seen
Winning Landslidefor Second Term in 2001 IBT Direct-Vote Election, TRAFFIC WORLD, Nov.
27, 2000, at 22.
747. Gail Kinsey Hill, Leedham Runs for Teamsters President, OREGONIAN, June 9, 2000, at
Cl.
748. Schulz, supra note 746, at 22.
749. John D. Schulz, Teamsters Back?, TRAFFIC WORLD, June 19, 2000, at 24.
750. Id.
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$900,000 cut in the organizing budget."' Meanwhile the union was
receiving $2.9 million in new income through a licensing and list-use
agreement with the AFL-CIO. 72
Hoffa unsuccessfully pressed presidential candidates George W.
Bush and Al Gore to commit to terminating court-appointed
supervision of the IBT.753 He appointed Ed Stier, a former prosecutor
who had served for more than ten years as court-appointed trustee in
the IBT Local 560 litigation, to head up an internal anti-corruption
unit (Project RISE) that would hopefully demonstrate to the DOJ and
the federal court (now Judge Loretta Preska) that the IBT did not
require court supervision to keep itself free of corruption and
racketeering.7 54 Hoffa also proposed a "Democracy Package"
(including one-member, one-vote elections for convention delegates
and international officers) to be added to the IBT constitution.7 55 He
promised that "[t]he Teamsters will be the standard against which all
labor democracy will be measured. 756
In June 2000, the IRB brought embezzlement charges against
Lawrence Brennan.7 57 As the 2001 convention opened in Las Vegas,
the IRB accused Hoffa ally William Hogan and Hoffa aide Dane
Passo of negotiating sweetheart deals that ceded jobs to nonunion
workers in Las Vegas.75 Despite this embarrassment, Hoffa received
overwhelming support. Going into the 2001 convention, Hoffa's
campaign had raised $700,000, with an estimated additional
$400,000 from sales of Hoffa gear at the convention.759 Leedham

751. Schulz, supra note 746, at 22.
752. Id.
753. Id. It appears, however, that the lobbying effort may have succeeded with Barack
Obama, who told Hoffa during the 2008 presidential campaign that he favors ending, or at least
modifying, the court-appointed supervision. Brody Mullins, Obama Says Teamsters Need Less
Oversight,WALL ST. J., May 5, 2008, at At.
754. Marc Cooper, Where's Hoffa Driving the Teamsters?, NATION, July 24, 2000, at 11. For
more on the oversight of Local 560, see JACOBS ET AL., supra note 2, at 31-78 and James B.
Jacobs & David Santore, The Liberation ofLocal 560, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 125 (2001).
755. John D. Schulz, Odds-On Favorite; Hoffa Eyes Bigger Targets than Leedham as
Teamsters Convention Starts in Las Vegas, TRAFFIC WORLD, June 25, 2001, at 22.
756. Id.
757. Steven Greenhouse, More Troublesfor Teamsters President,N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2000,
at A14.
758. Steven Greenhouse, Teamsters, Tenacious as an Old Lounge Act, Convene in Las Vegas,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001, at A12.
759. John D. Schulz, Debating Time, TRAFFIC WORLD, Aug. 20, 2001, at 11.
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had raised only $10,000.76'
At the convention, Hoffa received
nominating votes from 93 percent of the delegates; Leedham
received nominating votes from only 7 percent of delegates76 ' and
was booed during his acceptance speech.762 In the lead up to the
2001 election cycle, Election Administrator William Wertheimer,
made a major effort to mount a debate between General President
Hoffa and Tom Leedham.7 " He viewed this as consistent with his
authority to "insure fair, honest, open and informed elections. 76"
According to Wertheimer, a debate would provide an unparalleled
opportunity for democracy building in the IBT. Lamenting the low
rate of voter participation in the 1991, 1996, and 1998 elections, he
expected that a debate would "energize the electorate, make the
election of their officers relevant to them, and encourage their
involvement in the process. ' ' 765 He further noted:

The importance debate serves in self-governance cannot be
overstated. Through debate, each candidate displays not
only his particular ability to think critically on substantive
issues, but of equal value, the candidates together
demonstrate for the membership that an 'uninhibited,
robust, wide-open' exchange of views of issues important
to them is not only encouraged but vital.766
In his August 22, 2001 memo setting out the rules for the debate, EA
Wertheimer explained that:
The democracy fostered by the Consent Decree is central to
its purpose of eliminating corruption that has existed in the
IBT. Unfortunately, the candidate forum provisions of the
various election rules have to date resulted in no candidate
forums, and democracy has been less than well served by
their omission. The September 21, 2001 debate, and its
broad disseminating to the membership, will mark the

760. Id.
761. Alison Grant, It's Leedham vs. Hoffa Again for Teamster Head, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER,
July 1, 2006, at IC.
762. Teamsters Jeer Hoffa Foe, CHI. SUN TIMES, June 29, 2001, at 54.
763. Office of the Election Administrator, In Re: Candidate Forums, Protest Decision, 2001
EAD 428 (Aug. 22, 2001).
764. Id.

765. Id.
766. Id.
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fulfillment of one of the significant democratic promises of
the Consent Decree.767

Both candidates agreed to a one-hour debate on September 21,
2001 at the National Press Club. 768 A panel of journalists would pose
questions to the candidates. 769 Because the debate would only
contribute to IBT democracy if it was widely viewed, Wertheimer
committed approximately $469,000 to producing half a million video
tapes of the debates: 200,000 each would be delivered to the Hoffa
and Leedham campaigns and 100,000 would be mailed to IBT
locals.77 °

On the day of the debate, Hoffa did not appear, sending Charles
Mack to stand in for him.77 ' Nor did the Hoffa campaign distribute
the 200,000 video tapes of the Leedham-Mack debate. 77' The
electorate was not energized; voter participation fell to 25 percent.773
Leedham lambasted Hoffa for not participating personally and for
permitting corruption to fester within the union.7

The general election did not generate much interest, the outcome
a foregone conclusion. With only 350,000 IBT members (25
percent) out of 1.4 million eligible members bothering to send in
their ballots, Hoffa won 65 percent to 35 percent.775
The 2006 election was much the same story. It did not seem to
matter that Project RISE had imploded amid charges that Hoffa was
soft on labor racketeering. 776 This time, Leedham received support
from just 6 percent of convention delegates, dangerously close to
failing to achieve the 5 percent threshold required to get on the
767. Id.
768. Id.
769. Id.
770. Id.
771. Id. Hoffa agreed to debate Leedham at the National Press Club on September 21, 2001
but then sent a vice presidential candidate to debate in his place; Hoffa's excuse was that he was
in Oklahoma lobbying the state legislature. John D. Schulz, Hoffa a No-Show, TRAFFIC WORLD,
Oct. 1, 2001, at 29
772. Office of the Election Administrator, In Re: Candidate Forums, Protest Decision, 2001
EAD 428 (Aug. 22, 2001).
773. Id.
774. Schulz, supra note 762, at 29.
775. Nancy Cleeland, Hoffa Leads in Ballotingfor Head of Teamsters, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2001, at 3.
776. For an analysis of the rise and fall of Project RISE, see James B. Jacobs and R.P. Alford,
The Teamsters Rocky Road to Recovery-The Demise of Project RISE, 9 TRENDS ORGANIZED
CRIME 5 (2005).

420

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:335

ballot.777 He accused Hoffa of selling members short in the 2002
UPS agreement, which, while leading to a $5-an-hour raise, resulted
in cuts in pension and health benefits that were not fully explained
prior to the membership vote."' Once again Hoffa sent a stand-in, C.
Thomas Keegel, to the presidential debate. 9 Hoffa received more
than 65 percent of the vote.' Voter participation plummeted to only
21 percent; there were 273,000 ballots cast by 1.3 million eligible
Teamster voters.
Percent of Eligible IBT Members Casting Ballots Per Election'
Election
IBT Members Casting Ballots
1991
28.2%
1996
34.0%
1998
34.0%
2001
25.0%
2006
21.0%

CONCLUSION

The remedial phase of United States v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters demonstrates just how powerful a remedy
civil RICO can be if the government and federal courts are
committed to reforming a corrupted organization. Because of TDU's
lobbying during the period leading up to the settlement, the consent
order in United States v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters,
unlike the approximately twenty other civil RICO labor racketeering
cases that the DOJ has filed since 1982, included complementary

777. Grant, supra note 761, at Cl.
778. See H.J. Cummins, With Eye on Teamsters' Top Spot, Hopefuls Hit Campaign Trail,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Aug. 19, 2006, at ID; Alison Grant, Dissent Simmers, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, May 7, 2006, at G1.
779. Steven Greenhouse, Hoffa Chooses to Skip Teamsters Election Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2006, §l,at 12.
780. Press Release, Richard W. Mark, Election Supervisor, IBT International Officer
Election:
Announcement
of
Final
Ballot
Tabulation
Results,
available at
http://www.teamsters81.org/docs/2006 11 18 final ballotresults.pdf.
781. See supra notes 329, 738, 772 and accompanying text; Michael H. Belzer & Richard
Hurd, Government Oversight, Union Democracy, and Labor Racketeering: Lessons from the
Teamsters Experience, 20 J. LAB. RES. 343, 353 (1999); Analyzing the 2006 IBT Election,
Teamsters for a Democratic Union, http://tdu.org/node/490 (last visited May 22, 2009).
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disciplinary and election-reform prongs.78 2 TDU believed, and
persuaded the government, that given a free choice, the union rankand-file would reject the incumbent racketeers and their allies in
favor of TDU-backed reformers. In this judgment both TDU and
DOJ underestimated the tremendous advantages of incumbency and
the rank-and-file's deep-seated indifference to union governance.7"3
Judge Edelstein and the trustees he appointed to enforce the consent
decree's electoral reforms first had to overcome Teamsters resistance
and then the logistical challenges involved in planning, conducting,
and monitoring a type of democratic one-person, one-vote election
that had never been attempted in a union with the membership size
and geographical reach of the IBT." 4 The goals were accomplished
because of the determination of Judge Edelstein, Election Officer
Holland, and the successor EOs.7 85
The elections prong of the United States v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters remedial phase has, perhaps unwittingly,
provided one of the most important experiments in union democracy
in the history of the United States. Hopefully, labor scholars will
attempt to evaluate the comparative advantages and disadvantages of
direct elections and of some of the more important rules on campaign
finance and expenditures. One would like to know: (1) whether
rank-and-file elections are better than delegate elections at
preventing labor racketeers from attaining union office; and (2)
whether direct elections are better than delegate elections for
replacing labor racketeers with honest union leaders. Hopefully,
union democracy scholars will be interested in studying whether
direct elections produce more involvement in and more positive
attitudes toward the union.
The government broke new ground in United States v.
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters by seeking electoral reform
as an anti-labor racketeering remedy." 6 The importance of the
782. See JACOBS, supra note 7, at 238-53.
783.

Cf SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET ET AL., UNION DEMOCRACY: THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF

THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION (1956) (concluding that Union members'
indifference toward union governance and politics made true union democracy unfeasible).
784. JACOBS, supranote 7, at 206-09.
785. Id.
786. After UnitedStates v. InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters, the government sought to
include a fair election remedy in the settlement of a number of civil RICO labor racketeering
cases. See, e.g., James B. Jacobs & Kristin Stohner, Ten Years of Court-SupervisedReform: A
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elections prong to the overall remedial effort seemed clearer in the
early 1990s than it does today. Organized crime had played a
significant role in the choice of Teamsters General Presidents Jimmy
Hoffa, Frank Fitzsimmons, Roy Williams, Jackie Presser, and
William McCarthy. From the government's standpoint, it was
crucial that the civil RICO suit result in an IBT leadership that would
be perceived as completely independent of the old regime.
Arguably, the government's goal in eliminating organized crime's
influence from the union could not have been achieved if the
organized-crime-associated clique, perhaps through a designated
surrogate, remained in power. The architects of the civil RICO suit
were much more concerned about achieving a desirable election
outcome than creating a democratic union. All the international
elections show that a secret ballot election does not assure a voice for
those opposed to the dominant regime. In retrospect, no change
could have occurred without Teamsters for a Democratic Union, an
entrenched rank-and-file dissident group.
Even with TDU's
participation, the advantages of incumbency have proved
overwhelming.
Ron Carey's 1991 election as general president was a clear
break with the leadership clique that had dominated the union at least
since the 1950s and apparently a clear break with organized crime as
well. 7 Indeed, certain observers of the IBT trusteeship charged that
the federal prosecutors, federal judge, and the court-appointed
remedial officers had come to regard Carey's victory as necessary for
the success of the RICO suit.
Carey's disqualification from the 1998 rerun election was a huge
blow to those who brought the civil RICO suit and to those charged
with enforcing the consent order. Moreover, because of James
Riddle Hoffa's close relationship with the Cosa Nostra bosses, there
was concern that his son's election as general president might signal
a return of Mafia influence. Fortunately, this has not turned out to be
the case.788 While James P. Hoffa might not have, in all cases,
Chronicle and Assessment, 6 CAL. CR-M. L. REv. 3, 30 (2004) (noting that the consent order in
United States v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners of America, 972 F. Supp. 756 (1997), provides court-appointed
"independent review officer" with authority to "supervise" free and fair election).
787. See JACOBS, supra note 7 at 209, 236.
788. However, note Ed Stier's stinging criticisms of General President Hoffa in Stier's
resignation letter to the GEB, resigning as head of Project RISE:
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moved aggressively against organized-crime-tainted figures in the
IBT, in his decade as general president, Cosa Nostra's presence and
influence in the union has steadily dwindled. Indeed, the Hoffa
administration has mostly cooperated with the Independent Review
Board in resolving administrative prosecutions and trusteeships over
organized-crime-tainted locals.
One could argue that, in the end, a democracy marked by
competitive factions that to some extent hold each other accountable
has not been achieved. In fact, the Hoffa administration has used the
powers of incumbency to cement practically complete control over
the union. There are only a handful of locals controlled by nonHoffa supporters.
Contested Convention Delegate Elections789
Election
Contested
Uncontested
316(51%)
1991
307 (49%)
1996
275 (48%)
293 (52%)
375 (73%)
2001
137 (27%)
2006
152 (25%)
454 (75%)
Judge Edelstein was insightful when early on he ruled that to be
effective, opposition groups had to have equal access to the
membership. But equal access has not been achieved. For one thing,
it takes a great deal of money to mount a nationwide campaign. Tom
Leedham's campaigns have not been able to afford a single mailing
to all Teamster members. Even when "dissidents" do break through
at the local level, the general president can undermine or remove
The second example [of Hoffa undermining anti-corruption investigations] arises out
of our ongoing mission to investigate organized crime activities in the union. As our
organized crime study points out, much of the racketeering influence in the union has
been removed through the efforts of federal law enforcement and the IRB. However,
some pockets of organized crime remain....
Over the past year, as our Investigative efforts became more known to potential
subjects and their allies, we began to experience active resistance from the General
President's office. It soon became clear that the pressure was emanating from
individuals whose interests were threatened by our investigations.
Jacobs & Alford, supra note 776, at 18.
789. See supra note 206 and accompanying text; Martha Gruelle, Teamsters Fightfor the
Soul of Their Union, LABOR NOTES, Sept. 1996, at 13; Election Administrator Report No. 3 at 3,
United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 4486 (S.D.N.Y. April 2001); Election
Supervisor's Report No. 2 to the Court at 3, United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ.
4486 (S.D.N.Y. July 2006).
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them through various means, including appointing personal
representatives to take over the local.
The Teamsters have had five formally fair international
elections, quite an achievement for a union whose leadership a
generation ago was chosen by Mafia leaders in back rooms. But the
union is not a thriving democracy. It is increasingly centralized and,
like most unions, a one party state. The responsibility for this state
of affairs ought not to be attributed to United States v. International

Brotherhoodof Teamsters. The case was brought to purge the mafia
from the union; according to that criterion, the lawsuit has been a
huge success. However, even on its own terms, the argument that
lack of competitive elections is incompatible with democracy is not
persuasive. If the definition of democracy required a significant
probability of party and/or leadership change in every election, few
countries, states, and other politics would qualify. There are many
nations, uncontroversially considered to be democracies, that have
been dominated by a single political party for a generation and even
by a single president or prime-minister for a decade or longer. In the
United States, southern states in the "solid south" functioned
politically as one party states for a hundred years after
790
Reconstruction.

The right question is whether the election reforms resulting from
the civil RICO suit played a role in purging the union of Mafia
influence and whether those reforms make it significantly more
difficult for organized crime to return to power in the IBT.
Admittedly, a number of IBT labor racketeers were removed from
the union as a result of the negotiations settling the civil RICO suit.
However, the 1991 election succeeded in defeating several members
of the GEB who were at least passively complicit in organized
crime's exploitation of the IBT. Carey's extraordinary victory must
be seen as a major blow against Cosa Nostra's influence in the union.
From 1991-1996, the IRB suspended and expelled scores of
organized-crime-tainted officials from the union.79 '
This
790. Chester Morgan, Presidential Elections: Mississippi's Voting History, Mississippi
History Now, http://mshistory.k12.ms.us/articles/92/presidential-elections-mississippi-votinghistory (last visited May 7, 2009); Republican Party of Texas, History of the Republican Party in
Texas, http://www.texasgop.org/site/PageServer?pagename=library-history (last visited May 7,
2009).
791. See Jacobs & Portnoi, supra note 19, at 465 (documenting the lifetime ban of nearly
twenty-five individuals for associating with a barred or suspended IBT member).
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development might have occurred even without the regime change
produced by the 1991 election, but that election and Carey's victory
clearly created space for cooperative witnesses and new leadership to
come forward. Carey favored new leadership at the local level,
whether challenged incumbents were organized crime's pawns or
"just" loyal members of the old regime.
Once a free and fair election of international officers (alongside
IRB investigations and discipline) had cleared out the most obvious
organized-crime-affiliated IBT officers, did the election apparatus
make it more difficult for organized crime to regain its influence and
control? Here we believe the answer is no. Organized crime could
regain influence by sponsoring or supporting a candidate(s) willing
to ally with them. The kind of Cosa Nostra that existed through the
1980s could supply money, muscle, and manipulation that could win
a formally free and fair election. Or it could bribe or intimidate an
honest candidate into becoming an ally after an election.
Fortunately, that kind of Cosa Nostra no longer exists. However, one
cannot rule out a resurgence or the formation of a different
organized-crime group that might find labor unions an attractive
target.
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